On A Journey Towards Meaning

Takrif Bangsa Melayu Harus Ada Penilaian Lebih Lanjut

2012-01-17T16:46:00.000-08:00

Saya merujuk kepada artikel BH yang bertajuk “Asal Usul Bangsa Melayu” (17 Januari 2012). Di dalam artikel yang ringkas itu, penulis telah membuat beberapa statement yang bagi saya memerlukan penjelasan dan penilaian yang lebih lanjut.

Menurut Ibnu Sina dalam karya tersohornya mengenai ilmu logik yakni Isharat Wa Tanbihat, beliau telah menggariskan beberapa syarat dan panduan dalam membuat suatu pentakrifan yang sah. Takrif ‘takrif’ ialah sesuatu frasa yang melambangkan esensi sesuatu benda. Justeru, takrif Melayu yang sah adalah takrif yang melambangkan esensi orang Melayu ataupun the “the essence of the Malay race”, yang harus memuatkan semua sifat-sifat yang dikongsi secara bersama oleh bangsa Melayu (genus) dan juga sifat-sifat yang membezakan bangsa Melayu dari bangsa-bangsa yang lain (differentia).

Namun, dalam artikel itu, penulis telah mengemukakan beberapa takrif orang Melayu yang alternatif, yakni takrif dari segi antropologi, etnologi dan budaya, tanpa membuat penilaian terhadap mana takrif yang lebih sah daripada takrif-takrif yang ada, seakan-akan memberitakan kepada kita bahawa esensi itu tiada wujud dan yang wujud hanya pendapat-pendapat yang berbeza dan saling bercanggahan antara satu sama lain. Ternyata bahawa statement seperti ini bukan statement yang saintifik kerana ia seakan-akan menafikan kemungkinan kita untuk mencapai ilmu mengenai hakikat bangsa Melayu (sophistry); statement yang sarat dengan pegangan puak-puak Sufasta’iyah (Sophists). Dalam erti kata lain, penulis seakan-akan ingin memberitakan bahawa tiada takrif yang benar, dan ini sesuatu perkara yang bercanggah dengan logik, kerana jika kebenaran itu dinafikan maka kebenaran mengenai kebenaran yang dinafikan itu juga harus turut dinafikan.

Ada juga statement lain yang bersifat paradoks yang dikemukakan, seperti “Ini menunjukkan orang Melayu tidak berasal dari mana-mana, tetapi berasal dan berkembang di Nusantara”. Bukankah Nusantara itu sebagai suatu kawasan turut dirangkumi dalam istilah ‘mana-mana’?

Jika pentakrifan dari sudut antropologi, etnologi dan budaya itu benar, maka apakah buktinya? Kalau sekadar memuatkan pendapat-pendapat dan kepercayaan individu-individu tertentu , yang dikira sebagai “di kalangan bijak pandai dan pakar kaji masyarakat” tanpa mengemukakan kriteria yang objektif yang boleh diterima bersama untuk menggolongkan seseorang itu sebagai bijak pandai dan pakar kaji masyarakat, belum boleh diterima sebagai bukti. Tambahan pula, ada pendapat-pendapat yang dikongsi boleh digolongkan sebagai falasi (fallacy) bila dinilai dari segi logik. Contohnya, takrif bangsa Melayu dari segi lahiriah itu agak kontroversial, kerana sifat lahiriah itu secara jelas bukan esensi.

Statement “dari sudut mana pun ditakrifkan, mereka mempunyai sejarah panjang” itu juga harus dipersoalkan, kerana jelasnya pentakrifan itu akan menjejas pensejarahannya. Jika pentakrifan bangsa Melayu dari antropologi itu dianggap sah, maka harus dikenalpasti bilakah orang Negrito, Melayu Proto dan Melayu Deutro itu dianggap sebagai bangsa Melayu, dan dengan demikian periode ‘sebelum Melayu’ itu tidak boleh digolongkan sebagai sejarah bangsa Melayu.

Secara tuntasnya, penulis harus memberikan hujah dan bukti yang bukan sahaja dapat meyakinkan pembaca untuk menerima pentakrifannya, bahkan turut juga memberikan hujah dan bukti untuk menolak takrif-takrif yang lain, kalau ingin dianggap hujahnya sebagai ilmiah dan saintifik.

A brief comment on Imran Taib's problem with Ash'arite Kalam

2012-01-13T09:17:00.000-08:00

I refer to Imran Taib's paper published in The Fount Journal, titled "The Problem of Pre-determination and Its Impact on Muslim Thought" (read article here). In that 37 pages long paper, he expressed his personal problem with the Ash'arite conception of Al-Qadar, claiming it to be 'far too fideistic and therefore at times, unsatisfactory to a more searching mind'. Therefore in pursuit for a 'less fedeistic' theology that would satisfy his personal, subjective criterion of a 'more searching mind', he champions the position of the Mu'tazilites, armed with 100 footnotes to demonstrate the depth of his knowledge in this field. Let me remind you that to judge the strength of his arguments by virtue of the number of footnotes one quotes is fallacious, and this brief comment that is not armed with 100 footnotes, to my mind, is enough to demonstrate the lack of depth and logical coherence in this journal paper.

The first premise: Ash'arite conception of Al-Qadar is a product of the historical and evolutionary development of Islamic thought

This is an argument typical of one who is trained in the sophistry of historicism and the social sciences; if everything is to be framed within a historical context, then there is no reason for us to believe that the statement "everything is to be framed within a historical context" is an objective statement. As such, by logical necessity, the statement "everything is to be framed within a historical context" must also be framed within a historical context, and this goes to infinite regress, demonstrating its absurdity.

Furthermore, he says:

"What we had observed so far is how Ash'arism rejected the Mu'tazilah's insistence on freewill and instead, chose to formulate a synthesis between freewill and determinism within what is known as the kasb...it is rightfully said that Ash'arism should be seen as or categorized more as a reactionary movement against the Mu'tazilism."

From his paper we can observe that the proof as to why 'Ash'arism' is to be considered as a synthesis and a reaction is simply the prior existence of two opposing views with regards to the issue of Al-Qadar. There is no reason nor evidence furnished to deny the existence of a third view which rejects both views regarding Al-Qadar as extremist views; this is committing the fallacy of bifurcation. As such, there is no reason for us not to believe that this third view already existed in the times of the fatalistic Jabariyah and the liberal Qadariyyah. In fact this is historically evident in Ibn Khaldun's Muqaddimah; this third view is the school of Imam Ahmad Ibnu Hanbal of whom Imam Ash'ari associates himself with in his Ibanah, the difference is that the latter picked up the skills of rhetoric and logic used by these two extremists to refute them in their own language and hence championing the already prevalent and mainstream traditional view of Al-Qadar.

To frame elements of Islamic thought as a historical and evolutionary process is in itself self-defeating, for such a claim necessitates the accusation that for the past 1400 years Muslims had misunderstood and misinterpreted the Qur'an and had made a fundamental mistake, thereby had misled Muslims in the course of their spiritual and intellectual history. If this is accepted as valid, then there is no reason to not believe that the early Muslims, and even the Prophet himself, had misunderstood, misinterpreted, mistook and misled on such an important issue that is categorized as one of the articles of Iman.

He adds that:
"We need to understand that Divine Message was sent within the context of a particular time frame. This is an indication that we need as many researches and inquiries there are to try and understand this knowledge clearly and correctly."

If Divine message was sent within the context of a particular time frame, then the message is no longer Divine, for if the message was Divine, it presupposes the notion of eternity. Therefore if Imran Taib is talking about an eternal message that was sent within the context of a particular time frame, there is no reason to not believe that married bachelors exists as well.

If the Divine Message was sent within the context of a particular time frame such that it necessitates more research to understand this knowledge correctly, then there is no way for us to understand this knowledge correctly, for our criteria for knowledge and research itself is limited to the context of a particular time frame.

If the Divine Message was sent within the context of a particular time frame, then Imran Taib would have to grapple with the question of why the Divine Message was sent within THAT particular time frame and not today. Why reveal the Qur'an 1400 years ago and not tomorrow where future man is definitely more matured and equipped with the faculties to understand the Divine Message better?

Premise two: There is not one authoritative view of Al-Qadar that is final and complete.
The relativism and levelling of the two extremist and fringe views of Al-Qadar to that of the same level as the mainstream view is already explicitly assumed:

"Can we treat the issue of freewill and determinism as an open problem? Or shall we claim that our understanding of the majestic nature of God's will and its true interaction with the human will, as final and complete? None can say that one's speculative answer is the definitive one, although one can maintain that the views offered do not by far, run contrary to the selective Islamic ethos. It is not utterly wrong to assume that the Mu'tazilites' views on qadar is not bounded within the Quranic statements."

If the validity of the Mu'tazilite argument is measured simply by virtue of it being bounded within Quranic statements, then there is no reason for us to believe that the terrorist argument for jihad, being bounded as well within Quranic statements, is less valid. As such, if we follow Imran Taib's logic, the terrorist view is equally valid. In fact, if every argument is to be viewed as equal, then the argument against the argument that 'every argument is to be viewed as equal' must necessarily be viewed as equal too. There is no objective truth in the end, and hence there is no truth in the statement 'there is no truth'. This is clearly absurd.

He additionally states:
"In addition, modern advancements in thought and science had created a need for us to re-evaluate our understanding of qada wa qadar."

If there is no complete and final view with regards to the issue of Al-Qadar, then there is no reason to believe that the re-evaluation of it in line with modern advancements in psychology and quantum physics is complete and final and correct.

Advancements in such fields are not really advancements, because advancements presupposes a final goal. But genuine scientific endeavor is a conjectural, continuous process that has no final goal, therefore it necessarily follows that to term conjectural statements made by science as advances is a misnomer.

Imran Taib also has to justify why he must lean heavily for theological and metaphysical support on theories of secular philosophers, metaphysicians, scientists, sociologists and the lot, whom most of them, if not all, did not even practise religion nor believed in it.

Premise three: The Ash'arite conception of Al-Qadar is self-evidently false
Imran Taib writes:
"One who believes that his destiny is fixed is merely professing a belief that runs contrary to his own conscience and actions in every day life."

To merely state this without proof is to commit the fallacy of begging the question. It is self-evidently false to claim that the belief in fixed destinies is self-evidently true, because if it were self-evidently true, then it would not be a matter open to debate in the first place, like how the whole is bigger than the sum of parts, or that it impossible for married bachelors to exist.

In fact, our own conscience tells us that we do not cause our own actions. We have no control over which neuron we have activated first, which tendon and ligament was moved first prior to the neuronal discharge, which bone was moved first with the activated tendon and ligament. If we intend to meet a friend at his house, our friend must exist first, and so is his house, and the transport that will take us there; all this is not within our control; they are fixed beyond our will to control. So how can Imran Taib say that our destinies are not fixed, when the only thing we control and is conscious about is our intention?

Premise four: The Ash'arite conception of Al-Qadar leads to fatalism, stagnation and decay
The charge of fatalism seem to be a strange one, because early in his article Imran Taib distinguishes between predeterminism and fatalism, and identifies the Ash'arite view to be the former as opposed to the latter, and then proceeds to label the Ash'arite position to be both without any further justification. He then proceeds to construct a strawman argument that he can attack by partially and dishonestly quoting sections of the Ibanah to conclude that "it is difficult not to attribute a sense of fatalism in the above proclamation of al-Ash'ari". To be frank, it is difficult not to attribute a sense of confusion and insincerity in the words of Imran Taib when he writes like this.

He attempts to justify his fatalism charge by quoting Anthony Kenny, stating that indeterminism exonerates God from the responsibility of sin. Yet this act of exonerating God, corrupts God in another way. The logical consequence of such a line of thought is that God now does not know particulars, and this is simply another old philosophical argument that is effectively refuted in Al-Ghazali's Tahafut Al-Falasifah.

To claim that this view leads to fatalism, stagnation and decay is to commit the slippery slope fallacy. There is no reason to not believe that Ash'arite conception of Al-Qadar also leads to positive outcomes as well, because it is not by logical necessity that such a belief leads to fatalism, stagnation and decay. Historical evidence has shown that scientific achievements within the Muslim world reached its zenith with the construction of the Maragha Observatories, when the Ash'arite belief was predominant and the Aristotelian worldview was rejected. Ironically, Imran Taib chose a historical method at approaching the issue of Al-Qadar, yet turns a blind eye to the historical evidence where he cannot pretend to be ignorant about.

Premise five: The Ash'arite conception of Al-Qadar is rejected by modernist scholars
Imran Taib's critique of the Ash'arite conception leans heavily on the authority of the modernist scholars. Since he does not reject authority, he must firstly prove clearly, based on an objective set of criteria which we can agree on, why these modernist scholars are to be regarded as more authoritative than the scholars of the past.

It is also strange why logically unacceptable views, such as the one expressed by Ghulam Ahmed Parvaiz, is regarded as novel and interesting. To my mind, it is novel and interesting in the fact that such an untenable position is expressed by one of scholarly repute, and to be quoted by another of scholarly repute. God has the power to limit Himself? If Parvaiz is right, then the argument becomes trivial; God has the power to create a rock so heavy even He Himself cannot lift. God can also will to limit His Power such that His Will is not realised. This sort of reasoning, that is, uniting two contraries in the same thing, is spurious and can be identified as fallacious by any entry level logician.

Premise Six: God's justice is the same as human justice
He claims that:
"..should justice as we understood is in fact different from God's justice, no ethical system is possible to be constructed and no meaning can be assigned to obligations and responsibilities.."

How then does he prove that the two notions of justice are one and the same? Did he meet God to ask Him? Where in the Quran is this stated? If such a view is to be accepted, then there is no reason for us to believe that the laws that are revealed and the laws that are created by human beings are different. In other words, to say that one is constructing an ethical system based on God is no longer a meaningful statement. Once this equivalence is committed, then there is no reason not to believe that Man is God. If such were the case, then it is logically consistent as well to not believe in God at all.

He can make the claim that, since Hasan al-Basri contended that there is no specific hadith defending his position on freedom of will, he is nevertheless following the Sunna, similarly and therefore Imran must be following the Sunna as well without the need to justify his views. This is an incredulous claim justified by a decontextualized reading of Hasan al-Basri. If all things must be contextualised according to the demands of history and the social sciences, then why are Hasan al-Basri's words treated differently? If the Sunna is to be believed rather as a general spirit of the mission than as a specific statement of dogma, then the view of the Sunna as a general spirit itself is a specific statement of dogma.

Conclusion
Imran Taib concludes his article by advising his readers not to pick and choose only the verses that seems to support one position, yet he is guilty as charged. He sneakily manipulates the du'a of the Prophet (Lord, increase me in knowledge) to his benefit, to show that there are new ways to assist us in understanding Al-Qadar. Yet if we examine closely, to introduce new ways of understanding that is contrary to the understanding that we have accepted and at the same time putting this new way of understanding as equally valid is not knowledge, it is doubt. Effectively. he is asking us to pray to God to increase our doubts. He then ends his paper by saying that interpretations are fallible in nature. If this statement were true, then his interpretation of this statement is also fallible in nature :p

Wallahu 'Alam

Of Expressions (Istilah) and Meanings (Makna)

2011-10-19T07:45:00.000-07:00

A recent discussion on the relationship between expressions (istilah) and meanings (makna) which unfortunately degraded to the trading of insults has given me some motivation to write on the subject matter. It is to me a quintessential example of how some individuals construct red herrings to distract people from the intended meanings conveyed, preferring instead to focus on the expression, even when the meaning has been clarified and understood.

Perhaps a brief background of this example would elucidate the statement above:

Which then degraded after the sharing of my opinion is positioned as a 'fitnah':

The nature of language
The ability to develop language is an ability possessed by humans, differentiating them from the other animal species. This is why man is defined as haywan al-natiqah, where haywan refers to the species of man which is from the animal kingdom, and natiqah which means "a certain power or capacity innate in man to articulate words or symbolic forms in meaningful patterns." Recently, Chomskian experiments provide empirical proof that this definition is correct. In that experiment, a human baby and a kitten were exposed to the same amount and type of information. While both specimens were able to demonstrate that they possess inductive reasoning, only the human baby was observed to be able to form a certain language to describe his experiences. This concludes that humans are not born with a clean slate of mind or a tabula rasa; they possess what Chomsky would describe as 'universal grammar'. As a Muslim, of course we believe that it is not just that linguistic ability; it is also the ability to recognize His Creator. Because using the same ability we were able to understand God's words during our witnessing of the Primordial Covenant and subsequently answered in our own language testifying the existence of the Creator.

As such, we define language as words or forms in meaningful patterns. What is meant by 'meaningful pattern' is the "recognition of the place of anything in a system' where recognition occurs 'when the relation a thing has in the system becomes clarified and understood'.

The relationship between expression (istilah) and conception (tasawwur)
Expressions are only to be treated as signs or symbols pointing to a conception that is understood in the mind, or in other words, the intended meaning. According to Ibn Sina, a study of expressions is nothing but a study of the concepts for which the expressions stand. In the same mould, Al-Ghazali mentions that when the meaning of a thing is clarified and understood, there is no need to quibble with expressions or terms.

Because expressions are mere signs, the intent of the speaker expressing the expression is also important if we are to know what meaning the expression is referring to. This is known as implicature or what the speaker is implying (Grice, 1989). In more simple terms, implicature means 'reading between the lines'. Although this may introduce some form of subjectivity in order to understand the speaker's intent, this subjectivity can be reduced if we have more knowledge about the speaker's profile, the context that he is in etc. This is especially crucial in scholarly discourse and the understanding of difficult Sufi terminologies. The more the person knows the speaker, the better his understanding of the expressions used.

The significance of this relationship
The knowledge of Islam is conveyed to us partly through linguistic expression and the meanings they refer to. This process is what Al-Attas describes as the Islamization of Language. When the Holy Qur'an was revealed several key terms and expressions used by the Jahiliyyah Arabs were given new Islamic meanings. For instance, the expression 'akram' or 'honourable', used to mean 'wealth, power and good progeny', is now Islamized to mean 'piety' or 'taqwa'. This is probably one of the reasons why the Prophet S.A.W enemies called him a madmen, because he used the same expressions as the Jahiliyyah but with meanings foreign to them.

The same phenomenon is also observed in the Islamization of the Malay World where certain expressions such as 'syurga', 'neraka', 'dosa' dan 'pahala' is now still being used by the Malays despite having Sanskrit origins, but with Islamic meanings and not connotations of the Hindu-Buddha Karmic cycle.

There is, however, a reverse process, coined as the 'Deislamization of Language' where language and linguistic expressions previously given Islamic meanings are now given non-Islamic meanings. Examples include the term 'Allah' used in the Bahasa Indonesia, which is now also used by the Christians to mean their Trinitarian God.

Additionally, learning the profile of the speaker and the context that he is in is also important so that we can understand what he really means. This is the reason why the study of the matn of a hadith cannot be made in isolation from these factors, else we will fall into the error of literalism.

The Problem
The speaker, Mr Z, intends to convey his conception of 'alim bayi' to Mr A. Mr A finds this expression conflicting with his own conception of the single expressions of 'bayi' and 'alim'. Mr Z clarifies what he means by 'alim bayi' as 'sifat alim...apabila ilmu lahir dari kosong' but this is simply dismissed by Mr A as 'incorrect expression' and 'confusing'. He proceeds to argue his point by unjustly isolating the expression 'kosong' from the rest of the sentence. The consequence of this isolation is that it can now be imposed to mean as a 'tabula rasa', or the view that humans are born with a blank slate of mind. Because of this, Mr A tells Mr Z that his usage of the expression is incorrect and confusing.

As a person who is acquainted with the speaker for 25 years I know Mr Z very well and can understand where he is coming from. As someone who has been inducted into the Ahmadiyyah Idrisiyyah sufi tarekat formally by a mursyid since the late 1990s, Mr Z is acquainted with the metaphysics of Islam through spiritual experience. However, he is not acquainted with the proper technical terms used by the authoritative sufis and theologians to express the meanings and experiences in his heart and mind. This is further made difficult by the fact that, as Fethullah Gulen admits:

"whether they are Sufi leaders or theologians, those who have expert knowledge of this subject have lacked the words with which to express the issues that pertain to the transcendental dimensions of existence.."

Therefore I think my criticism of Mr A that he is not being just to Mr Z is justified on the grounds that:
1) Mr Z is not acquainted with the technical terms
2) The technical terms themselves cannot be immediately understood

Perhaps we can do some justice to Mr Z by analyzing what he means:
1) Mr Z used the expression 'alim bayi' and not 'bayi alim'. Therefore the focus of the discourse should be the characteristics of 'alim' instead of whether the 'bayi' can be an 'alim', which is clearly nonsense. Therefore 'alim bayi' could be approximated to the 'characteristics of knowledge at the stage of the infants'.

2) Mr Z. proceeds to clarify what he means by 'alim bayi' with 'apabila ilmu lahir dari kosong'. The word 'dari' or 'from' is strictly to be used in the context of 'place-time-direction' (tempat-masa-arah) as opposed to the usage of 'daripada'. Therefore the term 'kosong' or 'empty' refers to a place-time-direction and not a mental condition (keadaan) known as tabula rasa which is wrongly assumed and imposed by Mr A. This place he refers as 'empty' or 'kosong' is probably the alam mithal or alam ruh, where the Primordial Covenant had taken place. He describes it as 'empty' probably based on his state of fana', where all he has 'seen' is 'empty', that is, empty from concrete, particular realities, because all that exists is 'Ideal Forms or Representations'.

3) As a meaningful whole, 'apabila ilmu lahir dari kosong' and 'alim bayi' would approximately mean as the 'knowledge that arrives from the alam mithal, potent in babies'. This absolute potency is called al-isti'dad al-mutlaq, described as 'the state of being mere potentiality capable of receiving effects'. It refers to the potential knowledge inherent in babies to remember the Primordial Covenant that was taken in the alam mithal.

This analysis effectively exposes Mr A's judgmental character and insincere attempt to understand what Mr Z means. It also serves as proof that there is nothing wrong, both structurally and meaning-wise, of Mr Z's message. The message can only be confusing to those who are impatient and not willing to exercize their God-given intellect properly.

Conclusion
I have demonstrated that:
1) Language is a symbol that points to a meaning.
2) The study of expressions is the study of meanings.
3) Implicature is an important feature in understanding the intent of the speaker.
4) The need to suspend judgment and analyze deeply what is meant by a speaker, so that we can come to a just conclusion of the subject matter.

"Indeed Allah commands you to hand over whatever you hold in trust, to their owners - and that whenever you judge between people, judge with fairness; undoubtedly Allah gives you an excellent advice; indeed Allah is All Hearing, All Seeing." 4:58

Wallahu 'Alam

Perlu membezakan antara istilah sekular dan sekularisme

2011-10-15T23:20:00.000-07:00

Saya merujuk kepada artikel BM berjudul "Islam Bukan Agama Antisekular" (16 Oktober 2011). Pada pendapat saya, ada beberapa perkara yang perlu penilaian yang lebih lanjut dalam penghuraian istilah 'sekularisme'.

Istilah 'sekular' diambil dari istilah bahasa Latin 'saeculum' yang bererti 'sekarang' dan 'duniawi'. Tidak seperti agama Nasrani, Islam tidak melihat kehidupan di dunia dan di akhirat sebagai dua alam yang saling bercanggah dan bercakaran. Kehidupan di dunia, sebagaimana yang dinyatakan di dalam hadis Rasulullah, ibarat tanaman yang bakal dituai di hari akhirat. Justeru umat Islam tidak boleh menolak kehidupan dunia. Ilmu mengenai dunia itu wajib diceburi untuk memenuhi tuntutan fardhu kifayah, dan inilah mesej yang disampaikan yang berhormat Dr Sheikh Mustafa Ceric.

Namun, pada masa yang sama, penulis artikel turut menyebut istilah 'sekularisme' seiringan dengan istilah 'sekular' seolah-olah kedua-duanya mempunyai makna dan penggunaan yang sama. Ini kurang tepat, kerana dengan penambahan imbuhan -isme di belakang istilah sekular, medan makna berubah menjadi perbincangan tentang ideologi, pegangan hidup dan pandangan alam yang hanya mementingkan kehidupan dunia semasa semata-mata. Ideologi ini yang dikenalpasti sebagai anti-agama, dan ini ditentang bukan sahaja sarjana dari kalangan Muslim seperti Tan Sri Professor S.M.N Al-Attas dan Fethullah Gulen, malah dari kalangan Non-Muslim juga seperti Jacques Maritain dan Pope John Paul XXIII.

Ideologi sekularisme yang diperkenalkan sebagai doktrin pemerintah Turki oleh Mustapha Kamal Ataturk menjadi bukti jelas apa yang sebenarnya dimaksudkan dengan istilah 'sekularisme', yakni sebagai pandangan alam yang menentang agama dan makna-makna ruhaniah. Bahkan, proses sekularisasi turut ditakrifkan Harvey Cox dalam buku 'The Secular City' sebagai penghijrahan manusia dari agama dan sebagai proses membebaskan akal dan bahasa dari cengkaman agama. Dalam karya Tan Sri S.M.N Al-Attas berjudul 'Islam and Secularism' pula, beliau mengenalpasti proses sekularisasi sebagai memiliki tiga komponen utama; yang pertama ialah pengosongan makna-makna ruhaniah dari tafsiran manusia terhadap alam (disenchantment of nature), kedua ialah penghilangan kepentingan agama dalam hal ehwal politik (desacralization of politics), dan ketiga ialah penafian terhadap ketetapan dan kekekalan nilai-nilai (deconsecration of values).

Namun, makna istilah 'sekularisme' ini harus dibezakan dengan istilah 'secular state' yang menjadi pegangan pemerintah Singapura, kerana yang dimaksudkan dalam perkara ini pula ialah sikap pemerintah yang neutral dan tiada berbelah bagi terhadap urusan agama.

Persoalan yang terakhir ialah, apakah faktor yang menyebabkan negara Turki moden berjaya? Pendapat yang pertama ialah mereka telah menerima sekularisme sebagai pegangan hidup. Namun, hal ini tidak dapat dibuktikan dengan jelas berdasarkan hujah-hujah yang diberikan. Pendapat yang kedua ialah mereka berjaya mengekalkan identiti Muslim mereka meskipun dicabar pensekitaran anti-agama. Hasil dakwah Nursi dan Gulen, rakyat Turki tiada menyerah kalah kepada arus modenisasi, sebaliknya melihat ia sebagai tuntutan fardhu kifayah. Ini dilakukan dengan pemahaman ilmu fardhu ain yang mantap, dinamik dan seimbang.

Barangkali pengalaman Turki boleh dijadikan iktibar untuk masyarakat Islam Singapura.

The fallacy of "balanced approach between worldly and secular knowledge."

2011-10-07T23:09:00.000-07:00

I cannot resist feeling amused and bewildered at today's MUIS-arranged Friday khutbah. I wonder who the writer is and I cannot help but wonder whether he knows what he is talking about. He said:

"Certainly, in the life of Ibn Khaldun, there are tremendous beneficial lessons which we can learn and emulate. His balanced approach between worldly and religious knowledge should be a prime example for us to follow. It should serve as a timely reminder for us to continuously pursue a deeper understanding of our faith from time to time."

Of course to the unsuspecting mind, one shall say "Hmm, that's correct! We must have a balance!" But wait, is it meant to be balanced? What does balance mean?

If by 'balanced' it means a harmonious arrangement of proportion or parts, then there is nothing to debate about, because harmony and happiness is the ultimate objective of every human being.

But when we say balance pertaining to two things, we usually mean equating one side of the equation with the other side of the equation in mathematics and science. In other words, the right hand side is equal to the left hand side.And this is what is usually meant by the Modernists in their rhetoric on the definition and classification of knowledge where divine knowledge is equal to that of the human sciences.

An unbalanced approach (taken from http://www.brainbasedbusiness.com/2006/11/paying_your_bills_during_unexp.html)

This message of Ibnu Khaldun's life can be distracting, therefore let's try to restate them in a form that would be clearer to us what is the essence of the message a Modernist would try to deliver:
Wrongly prioritizing leads to the problem of an unbalanced approach. Therefore to remedy the problem, we need a balanced approach.

What is the proof that prioritizing is wrong? What is the proof that this prioritizing leads to the problem?

Coming back to the question of worldly knowledge and religious knowledge, are they equal in importance? What is the real relationship between the two? Is one the subset of the other? Or are they mutually exclusive such that we need to divide an equal amount of time pursuing both of them?

Of course it is important to highlight that we are not discussing about whether worldly knowledge is important or not. It is obvious that it is important, but is it as important as religious knowledge? Therefore we are talking about relative importance, not simply importance only.

I wonder what is the proof for the equality of worldly knowledge and religious knowledge, but let's try to scrutinize this to the best of our abilities:

1. Religious knowledge comes from God.
2. Human sciences come from God.
Therefore religious knowledge is equal to human sciences? But this is a fallacy, like

1. Black is a colour.
2. White is a colour.
Therefore black is white?

It becomes clearer to us that just by stating the common aspects of two things (which in this case is the source) does not mean that they are equal in rank and the same.

Conversely, it has been clearly and firmly established by our erudite scholars like Al-Ghazali and Al-Farabi that knowledge is classified as divine and human, the former having superiority in rank and importance than the latter. The recognition and acknowledgement of this reality that knowledge are ordered hierarchically according to their various grades and degrees, is what Al-Attas defines as adab towards knowledge:

"Referring to the domain of knowledge, adab means an intellectual discipline which recognizes and acknowledges the hierarchy of knowledge based on the criteria of degrees of perfection and priority, such that the ones that are based on revelation are recognized and acknowledged as more perfect and of a higher priority than those that are based on the intellect; those that are fardu ayn are above fardu kifayah; those that provide guidance to life are more superior to those that are practically useful."

I think this statement in itself is self-evident requiring no proof. It is obvious to us that divine knowledge is perfect. Since it is perfect, it also holds a higher priority relative to the less perfect human knowledge:

1. Anything that is perfect holds priority.
2. Divine knowledge is perfect.
Therefore divine knowledge holds priority.

Perhaps I'd like to add another. To a blind person, science is not relevant to him. To the deaf, music is not relevant to him. To the poor, wealth management and economics is not relevant to him. But what is relevant for all is divine guidance:

1. Anything that is universal is superior.
2. Divine knowledge is universal.
Therefore divine knowledge is superior.

To do away with the priority and superiority of divine knowledge is a textbook case where an established and authentic definition of a thing is to be made undone:

"Authentic definitions become undone, and in their stead we are left with vague slogans disguised as concepts. The inability to define, to identify, and isolate problems, hence to provide for the right solutions;the creation of pseudo-problems; the reduction of problems to merely political, socio-economic and legal factors become evident. It is not surprising if such a situation provides a fertile breeding ground for the emergence of extremists of many kinds who make ignorance their capital."

One thing we can be certain about, is that in the Hereafter, Allah will not ask us whether we know how to integrate an expression, or to predict what happens when we expose a lighted splint to hydrogen gas:

A man dies and was interrogated by the angels regarding how he has spent his life. Man answers, "Well, I divided my time equally between pursuing worldly knowledge and religious knowledge." Angels ask him, "So do you know what are the five pillars of religion then?" Man shakes his head and answers, "I only know some of them because my time was divided, but you can ask me to solve a quadratic expression if you want."

Can knowledge be Islamized: A brief comment on the nature of knowledge and of Islamization based on Ibn Sina and Al-Attas

2011-10-05T18:25:00.000-07:00

We often encounter, in some of our higher level conversations, the term 'islamization of contemporary knowledge'. There are those who regard this term as a pejorative; an absurd thing that is to be made fun of, but is it a fair judgement? It is thus my intent to clarify and simplify the matter according to my own limited understanding of Ibn Sina's "Isyarat wa Tanbihat" and Al-Attas "Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam".

The common misconception arising in the minds of those who make fun of this term stems from the very fact that they view knowledge as an object. Thus, they fall into the fallacy of false analogy; they say: can a pen be islamized? can a chair be islamized? Therefore knowledge cannot be islamized, they say. But is this analogy correct? Is knowledge really an object? If we cut open the brain,can we see 'units' of knowledge flowing through the neuronal circuits? This pejorative view of 'islamization' is therefore an absurd view to begin with and it is with such a conclusive argument that we expose and dismiss the stupidity of such people.

As I have shown, knowledge itself is an abstract non-object, therefore it necessarily follows that the discussion on it is abstract. So for those of you who are, in Piaget's terms, operating at the concrete mode, this can be an uphill task. You have been warned :P

Knowledge, unlike things or objects, is "limitless and its definition can only amount to a description of its nature." Some describe it in relation to its end goal, that is to "understand a thing as it really is". Others, like Al-Attas and Ibnu Sina, describe it as a process. In this discussion on islamization, the definition of knowledge as a process demands our attention.

According to Ibn Sina and agreed upon by the logicians of Islam (Mantiqiyun), knowledge is comprised of tasawwur (conception) and tasdiq (assent). The tasdiq part is not of interest in this discussion because it pertains to the logical form and flow of an expression derived from the tasawwur part, hence the subject of interest is only the tasawwur part since this is more fundamental.

By tasawwur or conception Ibn Sina means the study of expressions or concepts for which the expressions actually means; the study of meanings. Therefore the composite expression "Man is a rational animal" can only be understood when single expressions like 'rational' and 'animal' is properly understood first. To understand the term 'animal' we must establish what is the relationship of the term 'animal' to other concepts (e.g the relationship between animal and the ability to move), and be able to clarify the differences between 'animal' and 'not animal' (e.g an animal is neither a plant nor a rock).

Al-Attas extends this view further. Since knowledge is comprised of units of meaning, and meaning is the formulation of relationships between the thing (e.g animal) and things other than the thing (e.g non-animals, the ability to move etc.), then it logically follows that meaning is the "recognition of the place of anything in a system, which occurs when the relation a thing has with others in the system becomes clarified and understood".

This brings us to comment on what is meant by 'place in a system'. We can think of it as 'arrangement' or 'order'. Take for instance, a set of numbers. We can arrange it in a variety of ways (ascending order, descending order, randomly etc.) and each way is different. Therefore it necessarily follows that there are different systems where a thing is placed.

Perhaps at this juncture we can summarize what we have discussed so far:
1) Knowledge is comprised of units of meaning.
2) Meaning is comprised of placing a thing in a system in relation to other things within the same system.
3) Different systems place a thing differently.

What is meant by 'islamization' is the placing of a thing within the Quranic system that determines the "condition of coincidence (of a thing) with the requirements of wisdom and justice." This is opposed to the placing of a thing within a non-Quranic system, whether magical, mythological, animistic, national-cultural or secular.

So how do we answer those who claim that all forms of knowledge should be accepted as valid because all of them 'come from Allah'?

We respond by saying that stating the source alone does not determine whether the knowledge should be accepted as valid. This is because knowledge is comprised of meaning, and meaning is comprised of placing a thing in a system in relation to other things within the system, and that different systems place a thing differently. Therefore the focus of our evaluation of knowledge is NOT the source, but the SYSTEM. This is what is meant by Islamization, that is, the establishment of the Quranic SYSTEM in the mind.

Since most of us undergo a secularized education therefore having a system in the mind that is secular in nature, Islamization is therefore a liberating process to replace this secular system with the Quranic one affirmed and acknowledged by God as the only true and valid system.

Wallahu 'Alam

Lebih berbahaya kalau ilmu wahyu dan ilmu kemanusiaan itu disamaratakan

2011-09-30T09:23:00.000-07:00

Saya merujuk kepada komentar saudara Norshahril Saat ("Bahaya kemaruk pada ilmu 'ukhrawi', 30 September 2011). Di dalam tulisan ringkasnya yang menarik itu, beliau mengetengahkan bahaya terlalu asyik dengan ilmu 'ukhrawi' sehingga meminggirkan ilmu 'duniawi'. Mungkin niatnya ialah untuk menyedarkan kita tentang kurang tepatnya dikotomi duniawi-ukhrawi yang dikenakan pada ilmu.

Sekilas pandang, memang gagasan seperti ini agak menarik, namun perihal ilmu bukan sesuatu yang boleh dibincangkan dengan mudah dan perlu perincian dan tinjauan yang lebih mendalam.Justeru, saya dapati beberapa hujah yang dikemukakan penulis memerlukan penelitian yang lebih bersifat mantiqi dan pembuktian yang lebih jelas.

Pertama, penulis cuba mengkaburkan martabat ilmu yang sudah dikupas secara teliti oleh ilmuan silam yang berautoriti seperti Al-Farabi dan Al-Ghazali, kerana beliau mengenalpasti masalah martabat ilmu sebagai penyebab kepada peminggiran ilmu 'duniawi', meskipun tanggapan ini tidak dapat dibuktikannya dengan jelas. Mungkin sahaja martabat ilmu bukan punca kepada peminggiran ini, tetapi salah faham akannya? Dengan itu, penulis telah berusaha menyamaratakan ilmu wahyu dengan ilmu kemanusiaan dengan mengemukakan pandangan beberapa sarjana kontemporari seperti Buya Hamka dan Said Nursi. Namun, bila ditinjau dengan lebih teliti, tersirat dalam pendirian sarjana-sarjana itu bahawa ilmu sains itu hanya patut dipelajari selepas ilmu wahyu yang bersifat fardhu ain dikuasai dengan sempurna. Mana mungkin kaedah sains itu menambah iman ataupun mengekalkan unsur tauhid kalau iman dan tauhid belum disempurnakan sebelum itu? Penulis bercanggah dengan pendiriannya sendiri bila mengatakan tentang keutamaan kehidupan akhirat namun pada masa yang sama menafikan martabat ilmu 'ukhrawi' sebagai yang lebih utama. Tambahan pula, jika benar pun wujudnya pandangan alternatif mengenai masalah martabat ilmu ini, hanya dengan menyatakan tentang kewujudan alternatif ini tanpa pembuktian belum cukup untuk sampai kepada kesimpulan bahawa yang alternatif itu lebih benar.

Kedua, penulis turut mengatakan bahawa semua ilmu itu datang dari Allah, justeru perlunya menimba ilmu dari pelbagai sumber. Dari satu pandangan statement ini nampak benar, namun dari pandangan yang lain pula ianya batil dan simplistik, kerana ilmu itu digarapi akal; justeru akal (mental environment) turut memainkan peranan dalam mencorakkan ilmu tersebut. Dengan demikian, ilmu itu sarat nilai dan tidak neutral. Secara tuntasnya, statement "ilmu datang dari Allah" tidak boleh difahami secara literal.

Ketiga, jika penulis menyarankan agar kita menghidupkan semangat ingin tahu (spirit of inquiry), ini juga bermakna kita harus bersifat kritis terhadap semua bidang ilmu moden yang sarat dengan nilai-nilai moden yang bukan Islam. Hanya dengan faham agama yang sempurna barulah kita dapat menyaring hikmah dari tamadun lain, sebagaimana yang dinyatakan Az-Zarruq.

Setiap individu mempunyai keperluan dan kemampuan yang berbeza. Pada masa yang sama, mengenal Allah dan memahami agama adalah keperluan asas setiap individu. Justeru ulama' silam telah mengklasifikasikan ilmu menurut keperluan individu (fardhu ain) dan keperluan masyarakat (fardhu kifayah). Persoalan yang timbul ialah, adakah ilmu sains itu keperluan asas bagi setiap individu? Adakah semua orang mempunyai keperluan dan kemampuan yang sama untuk memahami sains? Adakah jika semua individu Muslim menjadi saintis maka kita akan capai kemajuan? Apakah takrif kemajuan yang sebenarnya?

Saya menyokong usaha penulis untuk mensyarahkan takrif ilmu. Namun usaha seperti ini tidak boleh dilakukan secara hentam keromo kerana boleh menimbulkan kekeliruan dan bahaya, sebagaimana yang dinyatakan Tan Sri Professor S.M.N Al-Attas dalam karya 'Risalah untuk Kaum Muslimin'. Marilah kita sama-sama renungkan nasihat Abdullah Munsyi untuk tidak menyamaratakan "helang dengan belalang, kutu dengan kura-kura, dan ulat dengan naga."

Villains of knowledge: The nemesis of science, religion and truth

2011-09-13T22:52:00.000-07:00

I've been wondering, what is it that prevents people from arriving at the truth? Is the reason in our pedagogical approach? The seeker's psychological state? Or is there a deeper underlying problem pertaining to the value-system of the individual in relation to knowledge and truth?

While not denying that pedagogy and psychology has some influence in preparing the soul to arrive at meaning, let me present to you, in a candid way, the villains of knowledge. These are the Sophists; people who deny altogether that knowing something is possible. These descriptions are primarily extracted from Taftahzani, with some additions by myself, illustrations from Batman Comics:

1) The Relativist

You are only correct in your opinion. In my opinion, I am correct too. So both of us are correct, so there is no truth!

The Relativist believes that everything that we know is subjective.Therefore what we know are simply opinions, and all opinions are equally valid and 'true' in its own context. Popular quotes would be "You are not correct because that is only your opinion", "Don't impose your opinion on me", "Everything is only true within a certain context" and so on. This attitude seems to be held very strongly among the students and advocates of the humanities and social 'sciences' who treat education more like an opinion-gathering endeavour, not as a pursuit of truth. Therefore at the end of a learning session, we don't gain knowledge, we only gain a better appreciation of the opinions presented. No opinions are true and false, they say, so let's all suspend our judgement and sit on the fence. That is more 'objective'. Your opinions are yours and my opinion is mine,so let's all agree to disagree (that neither of us is correct or wrong).

So how do we fight this villain? Since they say that everything is subjective and are only opinions, then that would be ironic and paradoxical because their belief that "everything is subjective and are only opinions" is assumed to be objective. Since they already deny the objectivity of knowledge, it would be inconsistent to accept that their belief in this is objective too. How can one accept a part but deny its whole? How can we accept what they are saying is true since it is only their opinion of the nature of knowledge?

Sneaky people aren't they? Once we apply the law of the excluded middle, all their arguments fall apart!

2) The Agnostic

If I don't know, you must also don't know. Therefore everybody don't know! There is no truth!

The Agnostic believes that there is no possibility to really know something. Even if it can be known, it cannot be described and communicated to others precisely. Popular quotes include "Only God knows", "Only God can judge", "You cannot go into the mind of God therefore you don't know" etc. Some of the attitudes shown are that they get really defensive if somebody tells them that they are wrong, and then proceed to react by showing that their opponents are equally as ignorant as them without offering any alternative explanation or theory. Don't impose on me,they say, because you are equally stupid as I am too. I don't really know, and you don't really know. Everybody don't really know. So there is no real knowledge of anything.

So how do we nail this criminal? They say that they don't know, so we should ask them, how do they know that they don't know? Because if they tell us that they don't know, then implicitly suggests that they have knowledge that they don't know. How can they deny the totality of knowledge while accepting one kind? We can also cheekily ask them, "What is 1+1?" If they give us an answer then we may say "No in actual fact you don't know. Go ask God then!" Or you can ask them, "What is your name?" If they give you an answer, then we may say "I don't have to ask from God to know that didn't I?"

3) The Obstinate

Why do you think you are right? What is right? What is what?

The Obstinate are, by nature, stubborn people, cold-hearted towards the warmth of truth, drowning in compunded ignorance. Even if you tell them that this is the truth, presenting them with proofs, they would just brush it off in denial. They may even resort to skepticism to deny your proofs, as if to show that they are capable of dissecting your arguments, although in actual fact they are actually ridiculing themselves because of their denial of some truths that are quite self-evident. For example, if you tell them that there is either a God or there is no God, they would proceed to ask you for proof, as if the question itself is not self-evident enough. Popular responses would be the false usage of the 'Begging the question' fallacy and other skeptical attitudes towards knowledge.

This villain is hardest to combat. To an unsuspecting eye, they seem to be the champions of the 'freedom and right to think how I want it to be' and the 'right to disagree'. But this is preposterous; if people are allowed to think as and how they want it to be then everything will be topsy-turvy. Sometimes it is better to leave this people alone, for they are more like mad men rather then rational beings. Other times it is better that we turn the tables around and apply the same skepticism towards them to show that at some point things are just self-evident as they are; these are axioms (see my article on axioms). For instance, if they ask for proof that is already given validly,soundly and self-evident in nature, we should ask them why do they ask for proof. They may give you an answer and you may proceed to further ask why tothe extent that they just give up altogether,with the hope that one day they would realise that their skepticism only breeds stupidity and irritation!

4) The Character Assassin

You are wrong because you suck.

The Character Assassin is the most popular character among the nemesis of truth. This villain seeks to destroy his opponents not by virtue of his opponent's arguments, but by virtue of the opponent's character, reputation and intention. They focus not on the content of the argument, but the tone and the character of the argumentator. They are emotional in their arguments, very touchy and defensive and would resort to humiliate their opponents publicly based on conjectural and speculative inferences. They show signs of having very little self-esteem and an inferior complex in the face of their opponents whom they perceive as superior to them. When they no longer have any strong, salient arguments, they have no choice but to attack their opponents on grounds other than the argument form so that they can win the debate. A frequent transgressor of the ad hominem fallacy, their frequent phrases include accusations that their opponents are "obnoxious", "malicious", and this is usually coupled with their display of false humility. For instance, "I know I am ignorant of the matter, but you are obnoxious so why should I listen to you?" In essence, you are wrong, not because your arguments are false, but simply because you suck.

The strategy against this villain is not to commit the same ad hominem fallacy, but to consistently stick to the arguments and ignoring his accusations and malicious allegations. Or tell them that their display of humility is not humility at all. Humility is not in the statement "I am humble", but in the attitude towards one who knows and towards knowledge. Tell them "If you have already admitted that you don't know,why even bother to challenge someone who knows? Arrogant is one who doesn't know but pretends to know."

5) The Hedonist

You are right? So what? LOL

The Hedonist is a villain who simply laughs his opponents off because he does not see the value of his opponent's arguments. In essence, they ask, why bother to know? Life is so short anyways, so why bother? Let's all focus on the 'more important things in life' like harmony, peace, fun and laughter. All this knowledge-seeking is only troublesome, so let's just focus on something more universal and agreed upon like entertainment. Even if knowledge is important, it is not important because it is, it is important because it is a medium to which we can attain other things like wealth and reputation. This seems to be the general attitude of people today, who prefer tabloids to books, who prefer gossips to lectures,who prefer television to genuine thinking and contemplation.

Any tactics to counter the Hedonist? Well of course we can tell them how harmful entertainment is, but would they even bother to listen to you? I guess we should just leave them alone. Ultimately they are, as the Holy Qur'an mentions, like grazing cattle, whose ears and hearts are sealed fromthe truth. Only Allah can unlock them. Somehow in one way or another,they would realise that such petty and trivial endeavours are unbeneficial.

In essence I have covered 5 different types of villains. They are not meant to be mutually exclusive and do overlap over one another. Furthermore the 5 villains can combine to form a single entity having all those characteristics known as the Super Sophist!

Hohoho knowledge is never possible for me!

Oh dear, I'm having a headache! To the Super Sophist, we just say:

"May Allah increase you in knowledge." Then leave them to ponder what that means :P

A Caveat for the "Which one comes first, aqidah or akhlak? A brief comment on the nature of ethics and morality" post

2011-09-10T17:33:00.000-07:00

My recent exposition on the nature of morality has been the centre of controversy in the minds of some who prefer to talk about the PERSON rather than the ARGUMENTS. It is with deepest sadness and trouble that I have to encounter such an unpleasant situation, but such accusations obviously has its merits, because God does not act in random ways.

It has come to me that there are those who speculate the intent and motivation of me writing a FB comment which is followed by a brief article on the issue, stating that it is actually a malicious personal attack on a FB comment of similar nature by another individual who posted it a day before. Therefore it is only natural for people to speculate,by virtue of chronological order, that the particular post by the person was the cause of my FB comment. This is further complicated by the fact that I was once close friends with the person, only to fall out a few months ago due to irreconcilable differences.

Let us be reminded that not only such speculation is equally malicious in nature, it also reflects the fallacious way people reason about things. This fallacy is in this form:

A comes before B.
Therefore A is the cause of B.

When A and B could also be separate events altogether that is not linked in any causal way.

Just to clarify, this blog post is not intended as a defense for myself in response to those people because ultimately my actions, intentions and deeds are not accountable to them in the first place. The higher motivation for us is to form an appreciation on the thought processes, purposely arranged chronologically from the latest to earliest in the face of this chronological fallacy, that have resulted in me forming such a conclusion.

1. "The pathetic fallacy is an ingrained and profoundly influential habit, especially in biology, where intimations of intelligent agency seem irresistible even to those who deplore them."

On Sept 4, 8.16 p.m, I shared a link.This is intended to show that the use of metaphors in science had actually resulted in the formation of erroneous conclusions. Such metaphors have been used in justification of evolutionary theory of ethics and morality.

2. "If I place two similar cakes side by side one another, does that necessarily mean that they come from the same baker?"

On August 25, 11.35 a.m, I posted this status update as a metaphor that evolutionary theory is false, and as such evolutionary ethics is false too.

3. "Reading Nicholas Malebranche in contrast with Ibn Sina and Al-Ghazali relating to the philosophy of mind"

On August 22, 9.39 p.m, I posted this status update to express my interesting findings of the similarities between Malebranche and Ibn Sina and Al-Ghazali with regards to how knowledge is perceived in the intellect. This validates my initial assertion that animals have no reasoning capabilities, and therefore cannot possess morality.

4. "Anyone up for 'democratization' of knowledge? :p"

On August 16, 2.25 p.m, I posted a link to remind us the sources of error in our pursuit of truth, which includes the reduction of the meanings of terms. This is in relation to key terms in Islam including akhlak. When the meaning of akhlak is reduced to ethics, it is a recipe for trouble, because akhlak must necessarily include aqidah.

5. "Practising the art of writing a refutation to this article hmm..."

On August 16, 1.46 p.m, I posted another link expresssing my interest to write a refutation of evolutionary ethics. This is by far the most clearest indication that writing an article of such nature is already potent in my mind.

This is not inclusive of the many other discussions of the same nature with my friends at the Suffah Study Circle, with Wan Aimran, and to a lesser extent Eman Lim where I commented on his FB post on whether it is closer to the truth to be 'morally good' but don't profess beliefs or to profess beliefs but is not 'morally good', which can stand as witnesses and proof.

With this, I hope that the people involved in such pathetic, malicious accusations retract their statements and focus on the ARGUMENTS and not the PERSON. It is one to be obstinate in the face of conclusive proofs and truth, but it is another to be malicious, because the former may only reflect stupidity, the latter reflects bad character.

Wallahu 'Alam

Which one comes first, aqidah or akhlak? A brief comment on the nature of ethics and morality

2011-09-07T19:57:00.000-07:00

Recently my FB wall played host to quite a lively discussion on the nature of morality. Before this I have been engaged in such discussions with my good friend Wan Aimran from Malaysia in which I benefitted alot from the contemplation and reflection on the readings of such matters. Strangely, this issue of whether akhlak comes first or aqidah comes first should not be an issue in the first place. Unfortunately many Muslims today, alienated from proper understanding of religion, have made this an issue as if these things are not self-evident and self-explanatory in the Holy Quran and the Hadith. As such I have taken myself to task to comment on this issue to the best of my abilities.

A little bit of background info: why this issue surfaced is because people are duly influenced by the ideas of secular ethics and morality without religion and the sophistry of religious pluralism. Apologetic Muslims hence will claim that non-Muslims have their own system of beliefs and moral codes that are equal and valid, hence they are also correct in their own ways. Such relativist and subjectivist positions are quite common in this post-modern age which denies the possibility of knowledge and arriving at the truth. This task is then aimed at guiding the perplexed and a brief refutation of the agnostics and sophists of today.

Proof by tradition
Establishing aqidah must take precedence over akhlak based on the following proofs:

1) From the Holy Qur'an
"Whoever does righteousness, whether male or female, while he is a believer - We will surely cause him to live a good life, and We will surely give them their reward [in the Hereafter] according to the best of what they used to do." 16:97

2) From the Holy Qur'an
"But those who disbelieved - their deeds are like a mirage in a lowland which a thirsty one thinks is water until, when he comes to it, he finds it is nothing but finds Allah before Him, and He will pay him in full his due; and Allah is swift in account." 24:39

3) From the Hadith
Abu Huraira reported: The Messenger of Allah was asked about the best of deeds. He observed: Belief in Allah. He (the inquirer) said: What next? He (the Holy Prophet) replied: Jihad (struggle to the utmost) in the cause of Allah. He (the inquirer) again said: What next? He (the Holy Prophet) replied: Pilgrimage accepted into the grace of the Lord. In the. tradition narrated on the authority of Muhammad b. Ja'far (the words are) that he (the Holy Prophet) said: Belief in Allah and His Messenger. Muhammad b. Rafi and 'Abd b. Humaid, 'Abdur-Razzaq and Ma'mar and Zuhri have narrated a hadith like this on the authority of the same chain of transmitters.

And countless others too associated with the precedence of belief over good deeds which only the illiterate would miss and the obstinate would attempt to deny.

Proof by reason
Advocates of evolutionary ethics argue that morality is developed over time by the process of evolution where animals develop moral codes for the survival of their species. This speculative theory is developed inductively by observing the 'altruistic' behaviour of some animal species. As such, morality is perceived and reduced to (observable) behaviour, driven by instinct to survive. Consequently, this denies the role of religion and revelation as the source of moral teachings.

Our answer to this absurd idea is this: morality cannot be reduced to observable behaviour only. Morality also includes a cognitive component that is unobservable and only known to the person producing that intention and judgement of 'prefering right action over wrong ones'. Such judgement requires a rational faculty (al-nafs al-natiqah), and this is absent in animals other than healthy human beings. Even the mentally disabled and the insane cannot be regarded as morally-responsible agents.

That being said, healthy intellect is a prerequisite for moral action and judgement. Actions based on pure instinct alone cannot be regarded as a moral act. Suppose we encounter a worker who is very good to his boss so that he can 'survive the office'. Would observing his behaviour alone be enough to conclude that his good deeds towards his boss is a moral act? What if he does this out of insincerity, plotting to overthrow his boss the moment an opportunity arises? As such, I would regard this fallacious view of morality as the behaviourist fallacy.

With that in mind, is reason then the source of morality that guides our judgement? We need to keep in mind that moral cognitive judgement and action alone is incomplete; judgement and action based on what? There must exist some form of rubrics where we evaluate our actions against. If pure reason becomes the source and basis of our actions then this is known as secular ethics.

Our answer to them is this: there is no concrete historical evidence to show that our notions of morality sprung out of a vacuum and into the consciousness of the philosophers, except that they come from revelation and religion. In fact, as argued by Said Al-Andalusi as with other sciences, when the Greeks were discussing on such issues, teachings of morality was already 'in the air', that is known to the people, brought by the Prophets sent to every nation and tribe, in this context, the ancient Egyptians and Syrians. Additionally, reason cannot be aided by reason; this is a circular argument.

That being said, the advocates of sociology and the humanistic sciences would claim that we have provided a straw man argument because ideas about morality does not spring out of vacuum, but out of socio-historical contexts and evolutionary development. Therefore society is the determinant of what is right and wrong.

Our answer to them is this: This view has little difference with that of the advocates of evolutionary ethics. They say that because society evolves with time, so should the way we perceive right and wrong; there are no moral absolutes. We say to them that morality must be universal, and universality must necessarily transcend space and time. Something that transcends space and time must be absolute, therefore morality must be absolute in nature. In fact, to perceive murder as morally-acceptable by society at one time is inconceivable. Then they may argue that they accept some absolutes like murder. We answer that if such were the case then the logical structure of their arguments would be incoherent and inconsistent with their beliefs of change, development and progress. How can one accept a part and deny its totality?

As such we have argued that:
1) Morality requires judgement.
2) Judgement requires reason.
3) Reason is aided by a certain measure/rubrics.
4) The measure/rubrics must be universal, transcending time and space.
Since features of universality and eternal-bindingness is only inherent in true religion and revelation, then morality cannot exist without religion and revelation.

Now religion in this discourse we define as the proper recognition and acknowledgement of God as a consequent of the indebtedness of our existence to Him. Since morality requires religion, therefore morality requires the proper recognition and acknowledgement of God.

Proof by analogy
Suppose A is a subordinate of B at his workplace. A recognizes that in this hierarchy he is only a subordinate and B is superior to him. Proper acknowledgement would require A to act in a way that reflects his place as a subordinate to B; this can mean carrying out tasks as how B wants it to be. If A thinks B is just a joke, it would be natural for him to be rude and insolent towards B; he may be completing certain tasks successfully but it is not in accordance with the way B wants the task to be completed; this is actually a form of insubordination or improper acknowledgement, although not in the explicit sense. Worse still if A does not even recognize B as his superior at all.

Therefore, right action of A follows from proper recognition and acknowledgement of B. The consequent (right action) must follow the antecedent (proper recognition and acknowledgement); the consequent cannot exist without the antecedent.

Proof by semantics
The term 'akhlaq', being Arabic in nature, is taken from the root words 'kha', 'lam' and 'qaf', where its morphology is closely and intrinsically linked to the terms 'makhluq' (creation) and Khaliq (Creator). From this we can make a learned inference that akhlaq refers to the subordination/submission of the makhluq to the Khaliq according to how He wants it to be. Therefore it follows that this subordinate relationship must be established and properly understood first (aqidah) before the makhluq can carry out his roles and responsibilities.

Wallahu 'Alam

High School Geometry: A Philosophical Perspective

2011-07-19T21:38:00.000-07:00

"Teacher, why do we study geometry?"

That, my student, is a very good question. A question that evades even the brightest minds of those engaging in a teaching career on a daily basis. A question that remains unanswered as the pursuit of knowledge is steered in the direction of student grades, of Mathematics Heads of Department, student filing of assignments, of chasing student homework, and of course, mid year and end-year teacher grading and bonuses. Sometimes my fellow educator comrades, do we ask ourselves, what is the meaning of all this?

Well of course we can dissect the question of why-ness from a utilitarian or pragmatic perspective, that is, by explaining the benefits of studying geometry. We can say that geometrical constructions can help land you an engineering and architecture job, especially in buildings and constructions. But is that really the meaning of geometry?

Perhaps a historical investigation would do more justice to this 'peculiar' question of why. A simple Google search can tell us that geometry originated from the Greeks, especially to the two 'fathers' of mathematics; Euclids and Pythogoras (whether this claim that geometry originated from the Greeks is debatable of course,especially in the view of Said Al-Andalusi). If we put in a little bit more effort to understand why they come with such an extraordinary concept that makes little sense to the phenomenal world (since there is no such thing as triangles and quadilaterals and all those other plane figures in nature), we realize that there is one thing that they are really trying to seek.

No folks, it's not the Philosopher's Stone. The word is CERTAINTY.

What Euclids did in his book titled 'Elements' was actually to set a certain basis for the sciences; this is known as an axiomatic structure. Then you may ask; what in the blue hell is an axiomatic structure? That's just a natural reaction because nearly all of us exposed to a scientific education are not exposed to its philosophy; the question of 'why science?'. Well, in a nutshell, an axiom is a proposition that is seemingly self-evident, that is, requiring no proof to establish that it is true. They are like our starting points to know something, or else we really cannot learn anything at all.

So what are some examples of axioms? We know with certainty that "a part can never be bigger than a whole"; this is what we call 'universal truths' established a priori by the faculty of reason. Or we can establish axioms that are defining properties of a thing or a science like "1+1=2", "Bachelors are unmarried male singles" or "God being God must necessarily be Omnipotent". In Euclid's geometry case, we have the 5 postulates which define the science of geometry such as the possibility of "drawing a straight line from any point to any point".

These propositions, either by a priori reasoning or by establishing definitions, form the base from which we can be certain about, and from this base or premises we can seek to find out more things like all those angle properties of a triangle and circle that we are teaching our kids in school about. Try drawing a triangle or a circle if we haven't defined how to draw a line or what a line is :P

Unfortunately, in this recent times, Man have become increasingly stupid, infected by the disease of sophistry. These stupid people deny the possibility of knowing objectively anything at all. "Everything is subjective" or "You cannot know or be sure of anything because you don't have the mind of God" are some of the atrocious statements people can come up these days.

Coming back to axiomatic structures, of course there are 'true' axioms and 'false' ones; we don't classify those axioms proven to be false as 'false axioms'. In fact we don't call them axioms anymore; we should classify them as something else, or rather, as pseudo-axioms.

Thus, it is from these axioms that we can know objectively about things we are not quite sure about. In Al-Ghazali's al-Qistas al-Mustaqim or The Correct Balance, Al-Ghazali demonstrates to us the usage of an axiomatic structure in the Qur'an. He gives the example of the Prophet Ibrahim A.S debate with Nimrod where Nimrod claimed divinity for himself because he can demonstrate that he can give life and death by freeing prisoners and executing them respectively. Ibrahim Al-Khalil responds to Nimrod with the following syllogism:

1. Whoever that can make the sun rise is God.
2. Nimrod cannot make the sun rise.
Therefore it follows that Nimrod is not God.

Ponder on the first (major) premise; that is an axiom by definition because divinity and Omnipotence is ascribed to God. The second (minor) premise is not an axiom, but an empirical fact from which we want to know more things about it. As such, from this logical deduction we attain new knowledge that Nimrod is not God.

Hence, this is what an axiomatic structure aims to do; to attain new objective knowledge that we can be certain about. And that is what a mathematical education should strive towards!

Well of course as Muslims we don't go to the extreme of using mathematics and logic for everything like what the Logical Postivists and those reeking in scientism are doing. Our erudite scholars have defined for us the limits of reason, like how it is pointless to reason out why we have to perform prayers 5 times a day and not 3 or 7 times. But with an axiomatic structure in mind we can argue rationally, in the spirit of the Qur'an, such that our arguments can convince our audience instead of relying on quotations from the Qur'an or the Hadith that most of our audience do not subscribe towards. Or we can scrutinize some pseudo-axioms that exist in modern science such as the belief that the world is eternal that is the premise of Darwinistic-Evolutionary biology.

So why do we study geometry? Think axioms :)

Reflections on the logical order of statements III, IV, IV and VI of the 'Aqa'id of Nasafi and rational proof of God

2011-06-17T05:35:00.000-07:00

I was reflecting on the logical order of the 'Aqaid as claimed by my teacher, and some effort at personal contemplation, by the will of Allah, have borne some personally satisfying results, praise be to Allah.

Some selected statements from III, IV and IV, translated from the oldest known Malay manuscript by our teacher Professor Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, are as follows:

III The People of Reality- may Allah honour them forever! - say: The realities of things are established in their existence,and the knowledge of them is certain in contradiction to the Sophists.

IV The means of obtaining knowledge for the creatures are three: first, the five senses; second, true report; and third, reason.

The five senses are hearing, sight, smell, taste and touch; and by each of these five senses one is informed concerning that for which it is appointed.

True report is of two kinds, one of the two is report that is successively transmitted, that is report that is established upon the tongues of people of whom reason cannot conceive that they would purpose together on a lie. It is knowledge arrived at deliberately, and it induces necessary knowledge like the knowledge of departed kings of past times, and of distant countries. The second kind is the report of the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless and give him peace, confirmed by miracle, and this induces deductive knowledge and the knowledge established by it resembles necessary knowledge in certainty and fixity.

As for reason, it is an instrument of knowledge also, and that which it establishes by immediate perception is necessary knowledge like the knowledge that the whole of something is greater than its part;and that which it establishes by deduction is called acquired knowledge, like the knowledge that there is fire when one sees smoke.

V The world in totality of its parts is a thing originated,since all of it consists of substances and accidents. Substances are self-subsistent and are either composite like a body or not composite like an atom- the atom being the part that is not further divided. As for accidents they do not subsist in themselves but are originated in bodies and atoms, like colours, states of being-existent, tastes in food, and odours.

VI The Originator of the world is Allah the One, the Eternal,the Living, the Powerful,the Knowing,the Hearing, the Seeing, the Desiring, the Willing. He is neither accident nor body nor atom; He is not formed not bounded nor numbered, neither is He portioned nor having parts nor compounded; He does not come to an end nor is He described by 'whatness' and 'howness'; He is not placed in a place, nor does time affect him,and nothing resembles Him and nothing is outside of His knowledge and Power.

If we are to further summarize and arrange these definitive statements in formal logic, relating to whether the reality of the world can be established through reason, I think it would look somewhat like this:

Premise 1: The reality of the world can be known objectively (from statement III)
Premise 2: Objective knowledge can be established through reason (from statement IV)
Conclusion: The reality of the world can be established through reason.

Note that the term 'world' refers to all that exists except God.

In accordance with the 'Greater Balance of Equivalence' in al-Qistas al-Mustaqim by Imam Al-Ghazali (English translation here), the first premise is necessary knowledge that cannot be doubted in opposition to the Sophists. The proof for the soundness of the first premise is here: Suppose that the Sophist claim that the reality of the world cannot be known objectively. By claiming so, it is equivalent to saying that 'it can be known objectively that the reality of the world cannot be known objectively; this is self-refuting! How can one accept one type of objective knowledge and then deny its totality?

As to the soundness of the second premise which is encompassed in the first (general) premise, the proof of it can be found in my own article here. With both premises sound and free from error or fallacy, we arrive, without doubt, at the conclusion that the reality of the world can be known through reason. While the 'Aqa'id did not include inspiration as one of the sources of knowledge, this is because Al-Nasafi meant to contradict the pseudo-sufis of various sects who made false pretensions on the account of inspiration. Inspiration is hence a reliable source of knowledge only for some, that is, the People of Reality, and not for all mankind. As such it is not just by virtue of reason that one arrives at an objective knowledge of the reality of the world; this knowledge is also supported by the inspiration of the genuine Sufi Saints.

Allow me to then comment on statements V and VI, arranged in formal logic as follows:

Premise 1: Reason demands that the world be composed of substance/atoms and accidents (Statement V)
Premise 2: Reason demands that atoms and accidents are dependent on an Agent (Statement VI)
Conclusion: Reason demands that the world is dependent on an Agent.

Perhaps a better understanding of what substance/atoms and accidents really mean would assist us. According to the Dictionary of Islamic Philosophy, substance or jauhar is technically substance, one of the fundamental terms with the philosophers: the first of the ten Aristotelian categories (al-maqulat al-‘ashr). As a general term jauhar signifies everything that exists in reality, all bodies and parts of bodies, the sky and the stars and the earth, water and fire and air, plants and animals, in short all things in the visible world. According to the Mutakallimun, particularly the Ash‘arites, jauhar is merely a bearer of accidents, and as a substratum of accidents it is constituted of atoms which by their aggregate compose the body.

Whereas accident or 'arad is is that quality which adhere to a subject, but–opposed to property –it neither constitutes its essense, nor does it necessarily flow form it, e.g. the color of man. According to the Peripatetics, accidents may change, disappear, or be added, while substances (jauhar) remains the same. Accident, thus, has no independent existence, but exists only in another being, a substance or another accident. According to the Mutakallimun, more particularly the Ash‘arites, however, an accident cannot exist in another accident but only in a substance. But no substance can ever exist apart form its qualities or accidents. Hence, the substance being inseparable from its accidents, like the latter, is also merely transitory, i.e. has only a momentary existence. Everything that exists, thus, consists of mere transitory units (atoms) having only a moment’s duration and needs must, therefore, be perpetually re-created by the will of God.

Thus in order that something may exist, substance must exist, as if it were the very starting point of all individual things. But nothing can exist merely as a substance; it must have accidental forms (a‘rad). For instance, a cat cannot exist unless it has some colour, while it cannot have colour unless it has quantity or some kind of magnitude. At once, then we have the first three categories: substance, quality and quantity, which are the intrinsic determinations of all objects. But the cat is equal or unequal in size to other substances; in other words, it stands in some relation to other objects. Moreover, the cat must exist at a certain period of time and in a certain place; must have a certain position or posture; and must possess (or be in) a state of comfort or discomfort. Again, all material substances as belonging to a cosmic system both act and are acted upon.

Thus, the proof for the soundness of the first premise, as described above, is known a priori, like the knowledge that "the whole of something is greater than its parts".

As for the second premise, the proof for its soundness, according to Al-Juwayni, is based on several principles; the affirmation that accidents exist and are added to atoms, that accidents are temporally produced, that it is impossible for an atom to be devoid of accidents and that it is impossible for there to be a contingent/dependent being that has no beginning. When these principles are accepted, it logically follows that atoms must exist together with accidents, and since accidents are temporally produced, atoms must necessarily be temporally produced too. When we affirm the temporal production of atoms and accidents, reason would demand that something other than the atoms and accidents- an agent- must exist which in Al-Juwayni's words "necessarily makes the temporal happen in the same manner by which the cause necessarily produces its effect.." This agent must not be of temporal nature like atoms and accidents, and this agent must necessarily be free, else it "leads to an unending chain of claims about a determining agent for the determining agent." This agent is Almighty God.

This rational argument for the existence of an All-Knowing and Omnipotent God necessarily rejects the claims of philosophers and of modern science relating to the eternity and indestructibility of the world; the eternity of matter and form, that God is not a free agent; that the world is His eternal effect and that He has no power nor choice to do other than what emanates from Him of necessity and that God does not know particulars/details. This is because we have successfully shown logically and from sound premises that the world composed of atoms and accidents is temporally produced and that God as a free agent causes everything at the basic level of atoms and accidents.

Summary of the philosophical aspects of the Aqa'id of Nasafi

2011-06-15T10:47:00.000-07:00

The following is the summary and brief commentary of the authoritative text summarizing the beliefs of the Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah, Aqa'id al-Nasafi, by our teacher and contemporary reformer Professor Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas. Words in bold are those which I personally take interest in:

Unlike some other statements of the creed in Islam, the Aqa'id begins with philosophical statements on the real essences of things; on the possibility of knowledge; on the objectivity of knowledge; on the causes of knowledge; on the atomistic metaphysics of substance and accident and the continuous creation in explanation of the theory of the universe; on the nature of God and on man's self. Beginning the creed on definitive statements about knowledge is most significant, for Islam is a religion based upon knowledge, and a denial of the possibility and objectivity of knowledge would involve the destruction of the fundamental basis upon which not only the religion, but all the sciences are rooted.

So al-Nasafi begins by affirming the realities of things, stating that they are established in their existence, and that the knowledge of them is something that can be established with certainty, in contradiction to the Sophists. Who were the Sophists, and what was their position on the question of knowledge and realities?

We may recall the ancient philosophical movement begun in Greece by men of pseudo-science who came to be called 'Sophists'. The leader of this movement was Protogoras of Abdera and the other chief protogonists included Georgias of Leontini, Hippias of Elis and Prodicus of Iulis. In their misleading but persuasive method of logic and rhetoric, they propagated an ethical and epistemological relativism and made man the measure of all things (Protogoras);they taught that nothing exists, and if something exists, it could not be known, and that if it could be known, it could not be communicated to others (Georgias); religion is a deception invented by the strong to subdue the weak,and hence prayer is superfluous (Georgias and Prodicus); law and its usage is merely something conventional created by human society and depending for its validity on a particular time and place (Hippias). They cast doubt on knowledge and the possibility of knowledge and initiated a thorough-going philosophical skepticism.

In Islam the Sophist became known as Sufasta and their various schools the Sufasta'iyah. Al-Baghdadi was one of the earliest authorities to write about them and to identify them into three groups. Al-Nasafi referred to them in the Aqa'id and his commentator, al-Taftahzani, mentioned the names of the three groups and gave a resume of their beliefs in his commentary. Al-Raniri, deriving perhaps from Taftahzani's commentary, also mentioned the three groups in question, giving a brief exposition of their beliefs in his Tibyan.

The names of the three groups mentioned are: 1) al-inadiyyah 2) al-'indiyyah 3) al-la adriyyah. The expression la adri means 'I do not know', and the la adriyyah are people who say that they do not know whether or not a thing has real existence. They are in doubt about the real existences of things, and are in doubt even of their own doubt. They are therefore people who deny the possibility of knowledge, and are properly called Agnostics. As to the second appellation, the word indi means 'according to me', or 'to my opinion'; and the indiyyah are people who say that there is no objective truth in knowledge; all knowledge, they say, is subjective, and the truth about anything is only one's opinion of it. In this sense they are epistemological Subjectivists. Finally, in the case of the third group called the inadiyyah,which means 'the obstinate', they refer to people who deny the realities of things and maintain that what we call 'things' are merely fancies and figments of the imagination. In a sense the Obstinate are closer in ideas to the Subjectivists than to the Agnostics, although in fact all the three groups have in common the denial of objective knowledge. The beliefs of these three groups,which form the basic elements of the position of the Sophists, are in direct opposition to Islam which, as I said, affirms the objectivity of knowledge and the existence of realities.It is obvious that such beliefs represent fundamental deviations from religion and from science and can bring destructive consequences in human society. It is also significant that al-Raniri in his debates and polemics against heretics identified as pseudo-sufis in the Malay world with the Sophists, so that the relevance of 'Aqaid to the religious and intellectual atmosphere of the time on this question is indisputable.

Since a very early period of Islam, a group called the Mu'tazilah had initiated the use of the science of formal logic as a dialectic, rationalistic method of discussion and disputation, revolving around the problem of interpretation of the obscure or ambiguous and anthropomorphic references to God in the Holy Qur'an; and they discussed and disputed such problems as those pertaining to the Divine Qualities and Attributes; the nature of the Divine Speech; the Vision of God in the Hereafter. They denied the Attributes, and also the Beatific Vision, and they held the Holy Qur'an to be a thing created. Moreover, they affirmed a power in man to determine his actions in the sense of free will, and they attributed incumbency upon God to do what is best for man. Refutations against their views by means of the same method of dialectic were established by the early as well as the later theologians in their various books; and the results of what was established are reflected in summary in the form of statements in the Aqa'id 7, 8 and 9 (on Attributes); 8 (on Divine Speech); 10 (on the Beatific Vision) and 11 and 12 (on man's actions). Their full meanings and implications can be understood from al-Taftahzani's commentary (see commentary here).

The philosophers held similar views as the Mu'tazilah on the above-mentioned issues,but they were more intellectually sophisticated, profound and disciplined in accordance with the philosophical method. Their position on the nature of God, of man, and of the universe was chiefly based upon the Aristotelian natural sciences and the Neoplatonic emanation system. They affirmed the eternity and indestructibility of the world; the eternity of matter and form. They maintained that God is not a free agent; that the world is His eternal effect and that He has no power nor choice to do other thatn what emanates from Him of necessity. Creation is the emanation of the world from God's absolute oneness. They denied the Divine Attributes, God's knowledge of particulars, the origination of the world in time, His creation of human actions, the indivisible atom. Their views were refuted chiefly by al-Ghazali on behalf of the theologians (see refutation here). In Aqa'id 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12 and 18 are to be discerned the position of the theologians in contradiction to the philosophers on the above issues, set forth in terms of propositions whose elaborations are to be found in al-Taftahzani's commentary and its various super-commentaries.

On the causes of knowledge set forth briefly in the Aqa'id point 4, the theologians contradicted the Sophists on the definition of knowledge; and they refuted some of the philosophers who denied the validity of reason as a cause of knowledge because of contradictions and differences in opinion particularly in speculative philosophy and metaphysics. Al-Taftahzani also pointed out that inspiration or intuition is a reliable source of knowledge only for some,and not for all mankind. Al-Nasafi's wording on this matter shows that the statement on inspiration is meant to contradict the pseudo-sufis of various sects who made false pretensions on its account. That intuition is a cause of knowledge cannot be denied, as it is firmly based upon the Sacred Text and the Tradition; and it is chiefly through the demonstrations of genuine Sufis and al-Ghazali that its general acceptance in Islamic epistemology was firmly established.

The position of the theologians on the nature of God, of the universe,and of man insofar as it concerns the formulations of a creed is concisely stated in Aqa'id point 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11 and 12. They affirmed that the universe is composed of indivisible atoms similar to one another. The atoms are devoid of magnitude, but when they combine they give rise to bodies. The giving rise to bodies is called generation while the separation of the atoms causing dissolution of bodies is called corruption. A void exists in which the combination, separation and movement of atoms can occur. Corresponding to the substantial atoms, there exist time atoms. Inherent in the substantial atoms are accidents which do not endure two atoms of time. The substantial atoms themselves would not in their real nature endure two atoms of time, just like accidents which inhered in them, but God makes the atoms endure by creating in them the accident of duration. God creates a substance, that is, atoms combined as a body and simultaneously its accidents. Immediately after its creation, it is annihilated and another takes its place, and so on for as long as God wills. Thus the nature of Being is discontinuous,and what is called natural law is in fact God's customary way of acting. All bodies are composed of similar atoms, and since there exists nothing but substance and accident, the difference in bodies is caused by the difference in their accidents. The accidents,which are of positive and negative kind such as life or death, motion or rest, composition or its opposite,and other accidents that logically follow from them, are superadded to substance and accompany the body of necessity. One accident cannot exist in another; every accident inheres in substance, which is its substratum. Since God's customary way of acting constitutes what we call natural law, and the Divine Will is not limited by such laws, there is, with the exception of logical contradictions, unlimited possibility in the world. The notion of the infinite with respect to bodies and causes are all impossible. Since the testimony of senses is not always valid with references to matters not susceptible of proof by sense perception- such as matters summarized above- the evidence of the senses cannot be accepted in the face of rational truth. The theologians further maintained the doctrine of difference between God and the world, and the origination of the world in time,and God's absolute and exclusive efficacy.

The rest of the Aqa'id treats of man's responsibility before God; of religion and religious beliefs and duties; of necessity of leadership in the Muslim Community.

Reasoning according to the Mutakallimun

2011-06-11T08:28:00.000-07:00

This is perhaps my own preliminary attempt at a modern commentary of Imam Al-Haramayn Al-Juwayni's Kitab al-irshad ila qawwati al-adilla fi usul al-i'tiqad or "A Guide to Conclusive Proofs for the Principles of Belief". This wonderful piece of work by Imam Al-Ghazali's teacher of Kalam struck me from the first time I set my eyes on it due to its concise and ordered nature in bringing about meaning to the objects of knowledge in question. In this case, the object 'reasoning' is dissected carefully, like a skilled surgeon, such that the recognition of the place of reasoning in relation to other things within a system becomes clarified and understood. One can only marvel at how the limits of truth with regards to reasoning is properly outlined, like how Al-Jahiz expounded on the term "bakhil" in his book The Bukhala.

The Grand Imam starts his exposition on the character of reason by stating that "the first duty of sound intellect, upon attaining the age of puberty or of legal sexual maturity, is to aspire after a correct reasoning that furnishes sure knowledge that the world was temporally produced." I sense that this definitive statement, being the first in this book, must be of great significance. If this first duty cannot be upheld, then inappropriate questions of whether the universe is created or eternal would become apparent in the later course of our reasoning. This also begs the question of how our childhood pedagogy and education system should be formulated such that the intellectual recognition of the created nature of this universe can be acknowledged by a child properly. As such, a Kalam-inspired education defines very early what the primary intent of reasoning should be, as opposed to modern scientific education which is more fixated on content and approach without a clear end goal.

The Grand Imam then establishes a clear definition of what reasoning is, as "the reflection that seeks that which establishes either certain knowledge or the preponderance of conviction." He then establishes what is correct reasoning, which is "what leads to discovering the method by which a proof is proven and the false is what precludes it." In this matter the Grand Imam has clearly outlined that reasoning is not knowledge; it is but one of the approaches among others that leads to certainty and stronger faith. What reasoning does is merely to examine the validity of proofs; this means that reasoning must be complemented by other approaches towards knowledge. Once this proof becomes apparent to us as valid, other things denied by the proof must be necessarily rejected. This somewhat brings me to the question of the Principle of bivalence in Western philosophic logic. The difference is that in the principle of bivalence, it only relates to sentences and propositions whereas the notion of 'proof' or 'hujjah' described by the Grand Imam here is ontological, that is, relating to existence and not just speech. This is because a sentence might be true but not real; we can write a newspaper tabloid that is logically-semantically structured, yet it is not a real story! However, Mutakallimun like the Grand Imam are not talking about merely what is semantically proven; they are talking about what is both true and real once the proof is ascertained to be valid based on some logical rules and operations established in the field of Mantiq.

The Grand Imam then proceeds by refuting the Empiricists (see Empiricism), imposing a dichotomy between the faculty of sense and the faculty of reason and then stating that one cannot prove the defectiveness of reason using the senses, because reason is not within the category of sensible objects. As such, how can one prove that reason cannot be trusted? Assuming one knows that reason is defective a priori (see a priori reasoning) then that would be self-refuting. Assuming one knows the defectiveness of reason by reason itself, then how can one acknowledge one kind of reasoning and then deny it as a whole? As such, there is no proof to say that reason is a defective way of attaining knowledge. Such proofs furnished effectively refutes claims of modern philosophers skeptical towards reason (see arguments against reason here). This skeptical attitude towards reason seems to be prevalent in this modern age where emphasis is on experimental proof (Perhaps we can sense this empiricist attitude in this article on reasoning here). Modern education is also skewed towards scientific experimentation; students are not properly educated in the art of reasoning as experimentation is the one and only way of attaining an understanding of the world and of reality. This reminds me of how Professor Al-Attas successfully discovered the date of the Terengganu Inscription; when we visited him in recent years he commented at how people doubted his ability to attain this through reason, preferring carbon dating as a method.

The Grand Imam then dismisses the question of how to affirm reasoning as leading to knowledge except through a priori reasoning or by reason itself as an invalid question that "does not yield knowledge or furnish a ruling principle". This, if true, again proves that the Empiricist have accepted one kind of reasoning while denying its totality in their bid to "oppose falsehood with falsehood", and such inconsistency cannot be accepted. He warns of the obstinate who, despite reasoning correctly, still persist in denying reasoning altogether.

The Grand Imam then clarifies what is reasoning in relation to what is not reasoning, that is knowledge, ignorance and doubt. In relation to knowledge, reasoning is not an actual realization of knowledge. Rather, it is a tool or method of enquiry that desires after knowledge such that once knowledge is attained, it is no longer pursued. As such, reasoning does not engender knowledge as how the Mu'tazilites claim, nor does reasoning necessarily leads to knowledge. This effectively dismisses other arguments stemming from this Mu'tazilite premise such as claiming that right and wrong is determined by reason and not Revelation.

While the Grand Imam affirms that correct reasoning would lead to knowledge, correct reasoning does not produce or cause knowledge. This relates to what Professor Al-Attas explained as husul and wusul in the Islamic concept of education. Reasoning is the preparation of a soul towards obtaining meaning, yet the soul only obtains knowledge when meaning arrives in the soul by the will of God. Thus we can imagine two things travelling towards each other, the soul and meaning, in which the intersection of these two things would constitute as the act of knowing. Reasoning would only be responsible for the soul's journey towards meaning, but is in no control over whether meaning arrives at the soul since this is dependent on the will of God.

In relation to doubt, doubt is the fluctuation between two beliefs whereas reasoning is "solely a desire for the truth". This reminds me of Western skepticism, aptly described by Professor Al-Attas in the parable of the traveller who discovered an oasis. Quenching his thirst, he decided to tamper the water with some salt of doubt, thus creating a never-ending thirst for knowledge. This is not reasoning. In fact, in the same passage, any sort of reasoning that does not yield any benefit/ knowledge nor produce a ruling principle should be dismissed as nonsense.

The Grand Imam then proceeds with differentiating between sound reasoning and false reasoning. Sound reasoning would lead to knowledge and is not connected to ignorance and all other contraries of knowledge such as doubt. He then mentions that "when reasoning is defective by the occurrence of a fallacy it becomes defective". I find this statement very useful and definitive. More often then not in our course of reasoning we find ourselves subjected to fallacies that we fail to detect, leading to absurd and confusing conclusions and dilemmas that could have been avoided earlier. A list of fallacies one should detect before proceeding with any discussion can be found here. Hence, fallacies cannot be categorized as proof and subsequently conviction and knowledge of a thing.

Subsequently, the Grand Imam proceeds by defining what is a proof, which is somewhat a tool which clarifies what was not known previously by virtue of sound reasoning. Proofs are divided into two, firstly rational proof which do not relate to anything other than what they seek to prove, and traditional proofs that rely on truthful report or divine command found in the Qur'an and the Hadith. In the words of my teacher, in modern times today the need for rational proofs becomes even more important because of the challenge posed by those who do not accept Revelation and hence traditional proofs. This however is somewhat lacking in the scholars of the Muslim world today because we are uprooted from our rich intellectual heritage in the disciplines of Kalam and Mantiq. Kalam must be revived, and an instructional reading of Al-Attas as a modern Kalam text is very much recommended.

The Grand Imam ends his exposition of reasoning by outlining that reasoning is obligatory by virtue of ijma' or consensus of the Community. In opposition to the Mu'tazilites, he maintains that the halal-haram of a thing is not determined intellectually, but by Revelation. This definitive statement rules out all the problems and complications that persist in ideologies such as Utilitarianism and Pragmatism since right and wrong is not determined by reason.

Jogjakarta from the perspective of a travelling philosophizing mind

2011-05-22T06:21:00.000-07:00

Recently I just visited the city of Jogjakarta which is mentioned by most travelers as the cultural capital of the modern state of Indonesia. Personally, this visit was not JUST a grad trip; not only that it provided me the opportunity to examine some of the things that were meant by Professor Al-Attas in his "Islam dalam Sejarah dan Kebudayaan Melayu" (full text available here, brief summary concisely written by a friend here), it also gave me the chance to be more in touch with my Javanese roots. After all, my forefathers were Javanese from the Kendal province.

Historically, Jogjakarta was the epicentre of many clashes of civilizations, being the major city of the ancient Mataram kingdom that witnessed the constructions of firstly the Buddhist Borabudur complex and then the Hindu Prambanan temple. Subsequently it also witnessed the establishment of the Islamic Mataram Sultanate and the struggle for independence against the Christian colonialist Dutch. At present, I believe Jogjakarta is also witnessing another important milestone- the struggle with modernity:

This struggle is not just apparent in the physical sense as depicted in this picture where horse carriages traverse along motor vehicles on modern roads. Rather, I believe the struggle against a captive mind is more important. As with most colonized Muslim states, Jogjakarta may have achieved independence from the Dutch for several decades, yet it has struggled, like others, to gain independence in the mind from their Western colonial counterparts (see Alatas Captive Mind).

The case for Diponegoro
To illustrate this point on the captive mind, let me highlight to you the story of Pangeran Diponegoro.

Prince Diponegoro, according to Western Orientalist historians, was a power-hungry deluded prince of the Jogjakarta Sultanate who led the ill-fated Java War and eventually surrendered in defeat and shame to the Dutch (see wiki article). This is very much in contrast to what the locals knew him to be; a Muslim reformist who inflicted heavy losses to the Dutch and was arrested out of treachery (see Raden Saleh's depiction of the hero here). He seems to me the Javanese equivalent to the Libyan hero Omar Mokhtar, a far cry from what the West portrayed him to be!

Lesson learnt: Be careful of where you get your sources from folks! That is why in our struggle against modernity, we must possess a critical scientific attitude towards knowledge and facts coming from the West no?

Borabudur, Prambanan and the Kraton: A Perspective
I personally think that one cannot claim to have visited Jogjakarta without having visited the three most important monuments in Jogja history. Borabudur obviously does not require an introduction:

The ruins of Borobudur was found by Stamford Raffles during his visit to the Java Islands. The stepped pyramid has three major sections in reflection of Buddhist 'spiritual stations', namely the Kamadhatu, the Rupadhatu and Arupadhatu.

Personally, I think Prambanan is more majestic than Borabudur. In fact, I also personally think that Angkor Wat is just a shadow of its architectural grandeur:

Prambanan was built by Sanjaya from the Hindu Mataram Kingdom. The main temple we see here in this picture is the Roro Jonggrang Temple dedicated to Shiva.

As like all other Hindu temples around the world, the walls of the temple describe the epic story of Ramayana.

What came to my mind when I was inspecting these ancient Buddhist and Hindu sites were Professor Al-Attas words in his book "Islam dalam Sejarah dan Kebudayaan Melayu". According to Al-Attas, the discovery of such architectural wonders gave momentum to the Orientalist historians' mission to downplay and minimize the role of Islam in the Malay world to the periphery, uplifiting Hindu and Buddhist influences in its place. This fits snugly with the vision of the Orientalist to enhance the role of the West as the liberators of the Malay-Indonesian community from backward mythological worldviews and as THE introducer of scientific and rational thought. Congruent with their intent to colonize our minds and have us enslaved as Captive Minds, we were hoped to be grateful to their coming, and subsequently follow their ways of life in disgust of our shameful past. In our defense, Al-Attas argued, using Henri Pirenne's (see Henri Pirenne) criterion for the assessment of the ushering a new era, that Islam has more far-reaching impact on the lives and minds of the Malays than as claimed by the Orientalist. He commented that in order to assess the impact of Islam, we need not look for physical wonders like Borabudur and Prambanan. This is because Islam is a worldview based on scientific and rational thinking unlike Hinduism and Buddhism practised by the ancient Nusantara which is based on art and aesthetics. In fact, it is Hinduism and Buddhism that should be reduced to the peripheries; religious practice was reduced to rituals practiced by the royal court due to political motives when the populace at large was largely disinterested. Little attempt was made to study Hinduism and Buddhism at the philosophical level; practice was selective, based on the justification of the king to continue being worshipped as demi-gods. Which is why the ancient Malay world did not produce any local Hindu or Buddhist intellectual. This is different when we are dealing with an Islamized Malay world where world class Muslim intellectuals like Raniri and Fansuri were produced.

Additionally, according to Al-Attas, in order to assess the impact of Islam in the Malay world, we should instead look at the linguistic and semantic structure and value of the Malay Language, which is now being used extensively in various forms whether Bahasa Baku, Bahasa Malaysia or Bahasa Indonesia. This extensive usage is not a result of it being lingua franca or language of trade, but rather it is used as the medium to spread and understand Islam as how other Islamic Languages are created and utilized such as Urdu and Turkish. Before the coming of Islam, the usage of the Malay language was also peripheral, restricted to several trading posts. It was Islam that uplifted it and made the Malay Language an international language, uniting the various ethnic communities into one common voice and integrating it with the rest of the world. Previously, it borrowed most of Indian culture and practices. With Islam, the focal point of attention was now the Middle East. Therefore, based on these evidences furnished, the Orientalist claims must be rejected.

Al-Attas thesis is that the Malay Language was preferred over the Javanese because it was a language that was not tampered by religion before. Unlike the Javanese Language where it was used as a medium for Hindu-Buddhist rites, the Malay Language was free from Hindu-Buddhist interpretations. As such, it was perfect to be used as a medium to communicate Islam, being enriched with Quranic key terms which reflect the Islamic metaphysical worldview that would not be confused with Hindu-Buddhist understanding and view of the world. This is why, according to Al-Attas, the Javanese were difficult to Islamize, possibly because some of the Javanese terms used to convey Islam was confused with a Hindu-Buddhist understanding. Walking in the Kraton (Sultan's Palace), I found out that despite praying five times a day and observing all other Muslim rites and rituals, the Javanese Muslim also offered weekly offerings to the volcano and sea spirit, much to my surprise.

The Problem of Syncretism
With this odd observance of Islam by the Javanese Muslim, it came to my attention; did the Javanese practised syncretism? This reminded me of my visit to Sewu Temple within the compounds of Prambanan, where the temple included both Buddhist and Hindu idols within the same complex:

According to Al-Attas in the same book, this theory of religious autochthony is a view forwarded by the Orientalist again to minimize the role of Islam. In thier view, what is perceived as religious influence is actually inherent since the ancient times in indigenous culture and traditions. As such, religious influences, whether Hindu, Buddha and Islam, are just mere labels in their view. According to them, in essence, the spirit, content and character of the Malay world is still the same; animistic and mythological. With this, the Orientalist claim that Islam merely harmonized what was already believed by the people. What the Sufis did when they arrived in the Malay World was to preach a spiritual version of Islam that can be readily accepted by the indigenous people who can now syncretize and mix their beliefs to their fancies.

While we can apply this theory to the influence of the Hindu-Buddhist religion, we cannot say the same for Islam. This is because of the stark differences between Islam and indigenous beliefs; one is based on reason as its medium while the other is based on aesthetics.

As such, the coming of the Sufis were not to 'harmonize' Islam with pre-existing beliefs, but rather to clarify the differences between the two major religions. This is to satisfy the demands for philosophical enquiry among the Muslim adherents as they became increasingly sophisticated in their understanding of religion and of existence.

Concluding remarks
Would we see a revival coming from this city which has witnessed the clash of civilizations between major religious and philosophical systems? In my opinion, why not?

Sifat sejarah menurut orang
Ibarat pentas bermain wayang;
Cerita lampau dihurai dalang,
Pabila tamat segera diulang.

Jika demikian mustahil pantang
Giliran Islam mula mendatang;
Lakonan lama indah gemilang,
Di layar dunia semula terbentang

A critique of modern technology

2011-05-04T23:04:00.000-07:00

I was reading on technology addiction a few weeks back and posted the link on fb and commented that it is not just the misuse or abuse of technology that is to be blamed, it is also the fact that modern technology,driven by modern secular philosophy of science is inherently evil. That comment attracted attention from a particular individual who disputed my assertions, stating that the term "philosophy of science does not exist" because it is non-homogeneous; there are many diverse and conflicting views on modern philosophy such that the usage of the term is incorrect. While I don't really know why I responded to a comment devoid of a sound logical structure I defended my stand stating that a lot of things in this universe are diverse and conflicting, yet they are classified and categorized, often loosely, under a more general term because they share some features and identities that are common and it is these common features that people comment on, not on the particulars and the details! When Al-Attas wrote his brilliant magnum opus "Islam and Secularism" he discussed the general features of secular Western thought and how this can affect the way Muslims think, this is by no means to treat secular Western thought as homogeneous and then attacking a straw man, because he also mentions that “If we could strike even a superficial similitude between a worldview and a picture depicted in a jigsaw puzzle, the jigsaw of modernity is not only far from depicting any coherent picture, but also the very pieces to form such a picture do not fit. This is not to mention post modernity which is already undoing all the pieces.” In a similar fashion I hope to comment, albeit briefly, on the common secularizing features of modern technology which has resulted in some of the acute problems facing humanity today.

That being said, allow me to write a short exposition on the subject matter. Even the definition of technology is disputed and yet to be properly established to enable a meaningful discussion on it, as Mesthene (1969) mentions: "Whether modern technology and its effects constitute a subject deserving special attention is largely a matter of how technology is defined." According to the Companion to the Philosophy of Science essay written by Mary Tiles, technology and its trends "cannot be understood by looking simply at technical problem solving and its methods", hence requiring an "understanding the complex economic, political, socio-cultural and infrastructural contexts of technological decision-making." She added that "technology introduced to solve are never purely technical problems...they have to be mass-manufactured, marketed and purchased...purchasing decisions are less than rational." Additionally, according to Woolgar (1987), "discussions about technology- its capacity, what it can and cannot do,what it should and should not do- are the reverse side of the coin on the capacity, ability and moral entitlements of humans."

According to Feenburg (1991), theories of technology are three: instrumental, substantiative and critical. The first view treats technologies as "artifacts which do not themselves embody any values, but are subservient to the values established in other spheres such as politics, culture, religion and economics. The second view attributes an autonomous 'cultural force' to technologies which overrides all traditional or competing values. This cultural force, in my understanding, is the secular worldview dominant today, having the three major features which, according to Al-Attas, are "the disenchantment of nature, the desacralization of politics and the deconsecration of values." The third view don't see technologies as instruments or as autonomous technical systems, but as non-neutral social constructs, because social values enter into the design, and not merely the use of technical systems.

I find the third view most appealing for this discussion but I cannot dismiss the first and the second views either. As such, I define modern technology as the "application of modern secular scientific knowledge to solve modern problems and meet the needs of modern secular capitalist society." Implicit in this definition is the concept of freedom and humanity as envisioned and understood by the West. As mentioned by Plato and Aristotle, it is reason which marks humans off animals. For humans to fully realize their human potential is thus for them to rise above their merely animal nature by cultivating and employing their rational capacities, freed from concern with the material necessities of biological life. Practical work is thus devalued; it is something that humans need to be liberated from if they are to become fulfilled beings. As such, freedom to lead fulfilled human lives was contingent upon the labor of others (slaves and females) providing for the material necessities of life.

Marx and Engels extended this Greek worldview by replacing slaves with technology to do the labor for us. In other words, the program of modern science are founded on an instrumental view of technology and on a vision of science as that which delivers the rational tools for controlling nature and freeing human enslavement from it. This marks the bleak dualism between Man and Nature. Man is no longer Steward of God for Nature; Nature is Man's adversary to be defeated and enslaved for Man's freedom. Nature is a 'problem' for secular man as it faces further disenchantment from secularization as a philosophical program. With secularization, Nature is no longer divine; they are mere objects, studied and manipulated as objects, separated from an ethical conceptual system defining its proper usage. While there are currently efforts to plug the onrushing antagonistic, adversarial attitudes towards Nature such as 'green' movements, efforts like this are merely lip service, driven by capitalist gains (a more detailed exposition on this can be found in Adi Setia's Islamic Perspective of Going Green). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, technology is also driven to meet needs. These needs are not human needs in the universal sense transcending time, but needs that are created by modern society itself based on market opportunities. Which is why we see some technologies developed for the created need for gaming and leisure because there is an opportunity to make money out of it. Think X-Box, Playstation 3 and Nintendo 360, just to name a few. Even the need for food and the technologies developed to meet this need is defined in the market sense; how much money can we make out of it? Is it commercially feasible?

Borrowing from Al-Attas analogy of science and technology as a knife on which its user determines its usage, the knife presented to us as modern technology is the knife which we now scrutinize in the court of justice as evidence for crimes against nature and humanity. It is a knife specifically designed out of secular notions of humanity and freedom, a knife that makes it hard for us to cut vegetables with, but easier for us to stab and kill. While we blame its user for the injustices caused, we also blame the knife design too no?

We need a new knife. A knife that makes it easier for us to cut vegetables, but difficult for us to stab and kill with it. We need an alternative, an Islamic alternative, to technology management.

The concept of freedom and humanity in Islam is defined by the concept of ubudiyyah (servitude and indebtedness to Allah), of khalifah fil ard (human stewardship of the earth) and of al-'adl (justice). Nature is not something adversarial; it is a symbol of the Divine to which we extend our just judgement towards, because we will be held accountable for our deeds and actions before a personal God. Our needs are not defined by market opportunities, but by the universal Maqasid Syariah which establishes the five fundamental rights of human beings: the right and security of life, of religion, of intellect, of progeny and of wealth. Nature is not to be studied as a mere thing, but as a system within a bigger system of ethics and accountability. When we study a pen we do not just scrutinize its technical details but rather how can the pen be used to do good and to prevent evil.

Perhaps an Islamic alternative philosophy of science and technology, if more extensively explored, can make positive contributions to the ongoing debates such as those on the environment, healthcare,unemployment, development and cultural diversity or education.

The Paradox of Simplicity

2011-05-03T22:58:00.000-07:00

I was reading one of the essays in A Companion to the Philosophy of Science titled "Simplicity" written by Elliot Sober and I found it quite an interesting piece of work to muse on. Modern scientists often appeal to a criterion of simplicity as a consideration that helps them decide which hypotheses are most plausible and true. This is because the data acquired by themselves apparently cannot single out one best hypothesis among all of its other competitors. As such, the standard scientific procedure for measuring what the data say about the plausibility of hypotheses is by way of the concept of 'goodness of fit'. Our acquired data always seem to be discrete and randomly distributed, but if this data can be fitted into our hypothesis or model better than others, we can, in modern scientific context, say that our theory is more plausible. This fact I can attest to being trained as a Bioengineer; I see so many of my peers painstackingly trying to fit a seemingly random distributed set of data onto a simple model and then explaining away the randomness of the data as 'noise'.

Perhaps a preliminary understanding of the subject matter can be derived from an understanding of the Occam's razor.

The main thesis of this essay is the argument of whether simplicity as a criterion for science is based on a rational, objective consideration or merely something that is aesthetic and subjective in nature. As aptly put by the writer himself:

"As important as the problem of simplicity is to the task of understanding scientific inference, it has additional philosophical ramifications as well. Empiricists have long held that science is, and ought to be, an enterprise that is driven by observational data: to the degree that simplicity is an extra-empirical consideration that is integral to scientific deliberation. To that degree does empiricism fail to be adequate to the subject it seeks to characterize? In similar fashion, debates over the rationality of science continually return to the role of allegedly 'aesthetic' considerations in scientific decision-making. If simplicity is merely aesthetic, but intrinsic to the scientific outlook for all that, how can the so-called scientific method be viewed as the paradigm of rationality,which all other types of human thought should emulate?"

The writer proceeds to argue in the direction that the simplicity criterion is a rational consideration. He starts his arguments with the views of Harold Jeffreys, who adopted Bayesian probability as proof to why simpler theories are truer than complex ones. However, this proof is also criticized by the writer as inadequate because "if prior probabilities merely report an agent's subjective degrees of belief, then there is no reason why we should accept Jeffery's proposal rather than inventing one of our own." Additionally he argued against this proof, stating that "it is difficult to obtain a language-invariant measure if a hypothesis's complexity" and that "it is impossible for simpler families to have higher probabilities."

He then proceeds with Karl Popper's claim that a simpler theory is more plausible because it is more falsifiable. This is based on his view on critical rationalism; something can be rationally considered only if it can be falsified. Since simpler theories have a higher degree of falsifiability, it follows that it has a greater degree of rationality. The writer then criticized this approach, stating that all hypotheses and models are falsified by randomly distributed data and that "rather than considering a yes/no question of whether a hypothesis has been falsified, we need to consider the quantitative issue of the degree to which a hypothesis says that the observations are expected."

The two approaches to the problem of simplicity begs the question of how much fit of hypotheses to data should be sacrificed for how much of a gain in simplicity.

The writer subsequently ends his arguments in favour of Akaike's criterion for hypothesis plausibility, in which a simpler hypothesis is more plausible or 'truer' than others by virtue of its predictive accuracy for new data sets. This is because simpler theories are more general and inclusive of newer data sets and hence can be used to predict future events better. In application to the Ptolemy-Copernican debate on the nature of the universe, Akaike's theorem explains that the Copernican theory is more plausible because it "had an astronomically superior degree of estimated predictive accuracy."

On a personal note, I find all these arguments for simplicity rather paradoxical. Firstly, the most simplest, most general, and most inclusive of all theories to explain natural phenomena is that God is the cause for all this. Would this theory then be most true? Why is this not adopted and blatantly rejected by modern scientists of today? Secondly, if 'predictive accuracy' is to be accepted as a criterion for plausibility, then at present there is no way for us to test its plausibility either, because we can only decide whether a theory is plausible only when future data is available.

The scientific method of induction and simplicity as criterion for truth, as John Stuart Mill mentions, is based on the assumption that nature is uniform, so Occam's razor can only be justified under the assumption that nature itself is simple. But is nature simple and uniform?

Which is why I think Al-Ghazali and the Mutakallimun's arguments for Occasionalism seem to be quite attractive in explaining the random and discrete data acquired. In this rather phenomenological approach we let the data speak for itself rather than try to fit it to our model, and the data speaks to us of a complex universe governed by discrete and random variables, not continuums, which lie in the realm of possibilities (mumkinat) and not of certainty. Every event is discrete and separate, contingent to the will of God, and does not necessarily have to follow an observed trend. As such, every observed event is a mere possibility. This effectively refutes Scientism, since science only talks of possibilities, not of truths. This gives credence to Al-Attas view of science as a definition of truth and not the truth per say; it is relative and requires Revelation as a criterion to measure its truth value.

Scientific data itself is proof that the universe is complex, discrete and random. What science does is merely a simplification of observed phenomena, of possibilities and of predicting these possibilities. Science as a standalone cannot lead to the truth.

Perhaps a new science, based on the paradigm of possibilities, treating observed phenomena as separate, discrete events based on discrete, random mathematics can be formulated with occasionalism as a premise.

Book Review: The Golem - What everyone should know about science

2011-04-13T23:01:00.000-07:00

One of the key features of secularization as a philosophical programme is scientism, that is, the view that science alone constitutes as knowledge, and that all values and objects of knowledge should conform to the findings of science, resting on the assumption that scientific enquiry is neutral, free from bias and uncolored from perception. This is related to the philosophical tradition known as positivism, or as mentioned by Al-Attas, the deliberate 'disenchantment of nature'and rejection of metaphysics and religion as mere speculation. See scientism.

This view of knowledge, of values and of reality seems to have infected the minds of some Muslims too, who in their rather hasty attempt to prove the validity and truth claims of religion and the Qur'an, resort to interpret/re-interpret Quranic verses in light of modern scientific findings. Therefore we find some popular 'Quranic miracle' science books littering the Muslim bookstores of today, for intsance, the claim that the Big Bang theory is 'Islamic' (whatever that means). This resonates perfectly with Prof Al-Attas description of the 'modernist' trend set by some scholars and intellectuals, "who have some experience of Western knowledge and culture and civilization, who since the end of the last century and beginning of this one till the present day have been unduly overawed by Western achievements- to speak, in their well meaning but misguided attempts to elevate the Muslim mind to the level of modern achievements in science and technology.." (Islam and Secularism, pg 40)

As mentioned again by Al-Attas, Islam itself has its own truth claims without any need for science. This is because "we do not, unlike Western Christianity, lean heavily for theological and metaphysical support on the theories of secular philosophers, metaphysicians, scientists...most of whom, if not all, did not even practise the religious life, who knew nor believed in religion without doubt and vacillation; who were sceptics agnostics, atheists and doubters all." (Islam and Secularism, pg 23)

"The Golem: What everyone should know about science" (see amazon bookstore) is a refreshing perspective that can serve as a refutation towards objectivity claims of modern science. This exciting book highlights the fact that in every scientific theory lies a sociological dimension or element that is far from objective. As such, theories are only partially, if not absolutely, determined by sociological forces at hand. This can be in the form of the 'democratic' practices of the scientific community where theories favored by the majority is 'imposed' as the truth whereas fringe views, theories and anomalies are ignored, destroyed or even explained away in light of the dominant paradigm/theory in place (see Kuhn's exposition on this fact in Structure of Scientific Revolutions). Or it could be politically or economically motivated as well, as seen in the examples and case studies given in this book.

Writers Trevor Collins and Harry Pinch, both Cambridge scholars in the department of History and Philosophy of Science, highlights 7 case studies demonstrating why science isn't exactly what most of us perceive it to be. One of the more interesting case studies is the Michelson-Morley experiments that were conducted towards the end of the 19th Century in the attempt to prove the existence of aether (see Michelson-Morley). At the same time, the Einsteinian theory of light and relativity was gaining momentum. Due to the difficulty in experimental design and control of variables, their experiments produced null results. These results then became a source of justification for Einstein's theory which became increasingly popular. This means that instead of explaining the anomalies within the Aether paradigm, the anomalies were explained within Einstein's paradigm, by virtue of its increasing popularity. On the other hand, red-shift experiments performed by Eddington (see Eddington's affine geometry) aimed at confirming Einstein's prediction threw out and ignored the inconsistencies and discrepancies.

While the writers claim that this is no attempt to say that Einstein's theory of relativity was not the truth, the writers commented that "it is a truth that came into being as a result of decisions about how we should live our scientific lives and how we should license our scientific observations; it was a truth brought about by an agreement to agree about things."

So how 'scientific' is modern science? Since science is not only about empirical observations of the phenomenal world and that it involves both the theorizing scientist and the paradigm of the community of scientists, there is always a subjective element involved in it that can be doubted and challenged. Hence, if we reason in the following way that:

1. Complete knowledge is the absolute removal of doubt and uncertainty.
2. Science cannot remove doubt and uncertainty absolutely.
Therefore science is not complete knowledge. And therefore scientism cannot be true.

This is not equivalent to saying that knowledge is not possible in the sayings of the Sophists or the Sufasta'iyah in tandem with post-modern notions of epistemology. In Islamic epistemology, science alone is incomplete. Science is merely partial knowledge that is relative and contextual in nature. There exists in Islamic epistemology, complete knowledge that is absolute and permanent and this is Revelational knowledge. Which is why how Muslims should conduct their science is based on what is certain, to explain or clarify what is uncertain. This is the principle in Mantiq (Islamic Logic) as well; movement from the known to the unknown. And some basic principles underlying the nature of this phenomenal world can be found in the Holy Qur'an. What science can do is merely to be used as a tool clarify and expand on this, because these principles have no room for doubt. In contrast, scientism builds itself on shaky, doubtful and shifting foundations that can never achieve complete knowledge of things.

Perhaps these ideas can be expanded further. Wallahu 'Alam.

Tahafut MAZA (The Incoherence of MAZA)

2011-03-09T20:13:00.000-08:00

I have been exposed to discourses on religious pluralism for quite some time. Therefore the new article written by the populist Dr MAZA on the subject matter recently on his blog PLURALISME AGAMA: POLITIK, FANATIK DAN REALISTIK came to me as a surprise, especially when someone commented that it is a discourse that delivers the "need to understand religious pluralism in a wider context, beyond Hick's definition". Not only is the chap a non-expert in the issue, his arguments are fallacious and incoherent, and this is my attempt to demonstrate to you why I think so.

His arguments are based on the definitions made by the Harvard University Pluralism Project: WHAT IS PLURALISM?. One can wonder whether he has made an in-depth semantic analysis of the meaning of the term, as if this definition is to be accepted without challenge. This goes quite contrary against 'minda tajdid' that he is propagating.

Dr MAZA's primary premise in his attempt to clarify the meaning of pluralism can be summed up in syllogistic form, that:
1. Pluralism is not relativism.
2. Pluralism is the encounter of commitments.
3. Pluralism is not relativism.

Firstly, this argument is circular. It tells us very little to make a proper judgment that pluralism and relativism are two distinct things. Secondly, what is meant by an 'encounter of commitments'? If this is meant as 'holding our deepest differences, even our religious differences, not in isolation, but in relationship to one another', it does not relate in any way to relativism or prove that pluralism is not relativism. Because one can still hold on to differences in relationship with one another and at the same time hold on to relativism too.

A and B may have differences, but they can approach each other with a relativist mindset, that is, that A is true relative to the context of A and B is true relative to the context of B. This is a sophistical approach towards truth; this is relativism as mentioned in Taftahzani's Syarah Aqa'id as the Inadiyyah. Relativism does not hold that A and B must be the same thing. Relativism holds that while A and B are different, they are different only in their own relative context and not in their truth values.

It is to be noted that Dr MAZA did attempt to explain, contrary to his earlier position regarding pluralism, that:

"Apa yang penting bukan istilah-istilah ini tetapi kepercayaan atau akidah seseorang muslim berkaitan hal ini. Jika dia percaya semua agama adalah berkongsi kebenaran yang sama, atau kebenaran itu sesuatu yang subjektif, boleh dilihat pada dimensi yang berbeza, maka itu pluralisme yang kufur. Jika dia menganggap hanya Islam agama wahyu yang diiktiraf di sisi Allah, namun kepelbagaian agama adalah sesuatu yang tidak dapat dielakkan, manusia mesti belajar memahami antara satu sama lain, berbincang dengan cara yang baik, sudi untuk berdialog dan menyemakkan sikap dan tindakan, maka ini tidak kufur. Bahkan itulah yang dilaksanakan oleh sarjana Islam yang terbilang."

All of a sudden, sematics are not important, faith is? But didn't you attempt to establish a semantic analysis before this?

Then suddenly, in the same text he mentions of two different types of pluralism; kufur pluralism and acceptable pluralism. Since he cannot establish properly what pluralism is from the start, we cannot know properly what he means by this. Because in order for you to give value to an object of knowledge, the object must necessarily be of neutral value. But furnishing proofs that pluralism is not relativism does not demonstrate adequately that pluralism is a neutral term.

Then in the same paragraph, he jumps from the meaning of (acceptable) pluralism to dialogue, as if dialogue is exclusive to subscribers of pluralism. This is a fallacy. Dialogue is an activity, not an ideology/orientation. While there are ideologies/orientations that are resistant to dialogue, this is not shown properly by him.

Dr MAZA then digresses from the subject matter:

1. "Maka, muslim tidak percaya semua agama sama di sisi Allah di sudut kebenaran dan wahyu. Ini soal akidah. Namun bukanlah bererti Islam membezakan manusia di sudut keadilan dan hak kemanusiaan."

This has absolutely nothing to do with pluralism. And there is no proof furnished that non-subscribers of pluralism do not hold on to universal justice and humanity.

2. "Demikianlah ajaran Islam. Jika ibubapa pun tidak boleh memaksa agama anak sendiri, inikan pula orang lain."

This also has absolutely nothing to do with pluralism. And there is no proof furnished that non-subscribers of pluralism impose their religious beliefs onto others. Neither is there proof that only by subscribing to pluralism will one not impose their religious beliefs onto others. In fact, pluralism IS imposing the pluralistic belief on two religions in dialogue isn't it?

3. "Islam mengiktiraf kebaikan yang ada pada agama lain dan pengikutnya seperti mengiktiraf halalnya sembelihan Yahudi dan Kristian dan keizinan berkahwin dengan wanita mereka."

This also has nothing to do with pluralism. And there is no proof that non-subscribers of pluralism do not recognize the positive attributes of other religions. And there is also no proof that only subscribers of pluralism recognize the positive attributes of other religions.

4. "Islam melarang penganutnya menzalimi penganut agama lain. Perbezaan tidak boleh membawa kepada penindasan dan kezaliman."

This also has nothing to do with pluralism. And there is no proof that acts of injustice and cruelty stems from the non-belief in pluralism.

Lastly, to express his rather cynical views on wahdatul wujud, he mentions that:
"Menariknya, ada yang lantang tentang pluralisme ini dalam masa yang sama menganut dan mengiktiraf ‘wahdatul wujud’ ala Ibn ‘Arabi iaitu kesatuan antara Tuhan dan makhluk dalam makam kerohanian. ‘Wahdatul wajud’ ini kepercayaan yang dikongsi oleh banyak agama dalam pelbagai tafsiran. Tidaklah pula mereka menganggap diri mereka telah jatuh ke lembah pluralisme agama. Maka, sekali lagi pelbagai persoalan timbul tentang isu pluralisme yang dibangkitkan oleh kelompok tarekat ini."

He does not seem to show intellectual vigor in demonstrating that wahdatul wujud is the unity of God and creation at a certain spiritual station. Neither did he attempt to demonstrate with proofs that subscribing to wahdatul wujud leads to (kufur?) pluralism.

In summary, the arguments furnished in the article does not reflect a proper logical structure, and much is based on rhetoric and ignorance of pluralism and wahdatul wujud as a subject matter needing in-depth analysis.

Wallahu 'Alam

Is Impossible Nothing? Of Possibilities and Impossibilities

2011-02-01T06:28:00.000-08:00

I was inspired to contemplate on this subject matter when I came across an angry man after sitting for a lecture organized by the Harun Yahya Foundation. The furious man demanded that one of the lecturers clarify his statement "Evolution is impossible", because it questions Allah's Omnipotence. Since nothing is impossible for Allah, why would evolution be impossible as a mechanism for creation? Or so he says.

This sort of thinking possibly stems from the premise "Impossible is Nothing." Kinda like those Adidas ads you've come across when you're walking along Orchard Road, like the one below:

I like Muhammad Ali; that is why I chose him over David Beckham although both posters have the words "Impossible is Nothing." :p

To put the term 'impossible' in its proper place, we have to understand what we mean when we say something is impossible. In this respect, I like Jim Pryor's exposition in http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/courses/intro/notes/necessity.html on the subject matter:

"The word "possible" in English has many different meanings. If someone comes up to you on the street and says "It's possible that I was born on the moon," you'll most naturally take him to be making some sort of (crazy) claim about what it's reasonable for him to believe really is the case. You'd be understanding his claim as "For all I know, I was born on the moon." This is a use of "possible" to express claims about evidence and knowledge. It's called an epistemic sense of possibility.

But there is another thing the guy might have meant. He might have meant, "Look, I know I was born on the Planet Earth. But things could have gone differently. I could have been born on the moon--if for instance mankind had colonized the moon in the 1800s." Here he's using "possible" not in the sense of "for all I know..." but rather in a metaphysical sense. He's not talking about what he knows. He's talking about what could have happened, if the world or history had been different in certain ways. We call claims of this latter sort claims about logical or metaphysical possibility...

It's important to be clear about what this bottom category, "metaphysically impossible," means. What it means is that that is not a way the world could have been. Let's try to come up with some things that would be examples of this.

Would it have been possible for the world to contain 3-sided squares? What would such a world be like? That doesn't really seem to be a possible way for the world to be, does it?

Nor does it seem to be possible for it to be raining and not raining in the same place at the same time. Nor does it seem to be possible for a person to exist and fail to be one and the same person as himself. There are no possible situations in which things of those sort take place. They all seem to be metaphysically impossible.

Now, so far, the examples we're coming up with of things that are metaphysically impossible all seem to have something to do with logic or definitions or math. That raises an interesting question: If something is metaphysically impossible, will that always be because it involves some contradiction or going against some definition?"

According to his classification possibly derived from the Logical Positivist school of thought, possibilities and impossibilities are classified as follows:

1. Necessarily true.
2. True, but could have been false.
3. False, but could have been true.
4. Necessarily false.

Perhaps the following diagrams would help enlighten further what 'impossible' might mean:

Things that are necessarily true are, for instance, all triangles are three-sided figures; we cannot imagine any other way in which this is false. There are things that can be true or false, for instance, the Darwin's Theory of Evolution, and to ascertain this we require proofs. Or we can call this metaphysically possible; despite the arguments against Darwin's Theory of Evolution, it is still possible to imagine a world in which Darwin's theory might work under God's will, but it is not in this physical world that exists. This we shall classify as Physical Impossibility or Scientific Impossibility.

BUT

There are things that are downright impossible, or metaphysically impossible, like squaring a circle or married bachelors.

HOWEVER

We need to be careful with reasoning like this because the criterion for truth according to the Logical Positivists is restricted to reason (aql) whereas as Muslims, in our Tauhidic approach towards knowledge we accept Revelation first as the foundational criterion for truth, yet we do not deny reason as a valid but secondary source of knowledge. In other words, the meanings encompassed in the Holy Qur'an is the primary criterion separating truth from falsehood! Therefore, metaphysical impossibility should be extended towards what is established in the Holy Quran as an impossibility.

Speaking of possible and impossible worlds, while the Logical Positivists get lost in their philosophizing such that the end objective of such efforts is forgotten (see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/impossible-worlds/) the Mutakallimun solved this problem of impossibilities quite some time ago in their expositions on the Attributes of God (Sifat 20), as seen in http://www.al-azim.com/masjid/infoislam/tauhid/mustahil.htm (pardon my English language readers since this link is in the Malay Language. But if you're interested perhaps you may want to read up on the works of Ash'ari and Maturidi on this subject matter).

Pryor adds that:

"If it's metaphysically necessary that a thing have certain properties, then we say that those properties are essential properties of that thing, and that they are part of the thing's nature or essence. So for instance, oddness is one of the essential properties of the number 3. Some philosophers would argue that being made of wood is one of the essential properties of this table. If they're right--if it is an essential property of the table--then there would be no possible situation in which the table exists, but it's made of plastic. (There may be possible situations in which some other table exists in the same location, and is made of plastic. But if being made of wood is essential to this table, then the plastic table would have to be a different table. It couldn't be one and the same table as this table.) Those properties which are not essential, we call accidental properties. For instance, being 3 feet tall is only an accidental property of the table (we could saw part of its legs off to make it shorter)."

In other words, there are what we call the essences of things (mahiyyah) or in more philosophical terms, quiddity,and there are things we call accidents (arad). Essences define the whatness of things; without it you can no longer call the thing a thing. For instance, without the act of sitting, there is no chair. This is what Al-Attas defines as the limits of truth; you can form an unlimited description of a chair but ultimately the essential property of a chair is that the act of sitting exists. Therefore when we deal with metaphysical impossibilities, we deal with situations where a thing loses its essential properties such that we can no longer conceive the thing to be the same. For instance, bachelors are in essence unmarried people. To say 'married bachelors' is paradoxical because once a bachelor is married he can no longer be called a bachelor. The same way Allah has Essences and Attributes; once you conceive Him in ways other than this as categorically defined in the 20 Sifat Mustahil, you are no longer conceiving Him properly in your mind; that flawed idea of God in your mind is no longer God in truth and reality.

Can Allah create a rock so heavy even He Himself cannot lift? This is metaphysically impossible, because it violates at least one of the 20 Attributes derived from the Holy Quran and rigorous reasoning. Can Allah have a son? This is metaphysically impossible as well.

But can Allah create the universe through evolution? Well that's physically impossible, yet metaphysically possible given the proofs furnished against the theory.

So is impossible nothing? Well if we contemplate further on what the poster meant, Muhammad Ali probably meant psychologically impossible but physically possible, for instance, it is your mind that is actually stopping you from doing the things that is actually physically possible. Yet if we take this statement out of context it can be very misleading, as if NOTHING is impossible. Truth is, some things are impossible, as demonstrated above.

According to Al-Attas, language is the instrument of reasoning of man. Therefore it is incumbent for us to know what meaning is intended by our speakers. A linguistic approach towards issues is key to a proper understanding of any subject matter.

Wallahu 'Alam

The Meaning of Integration

2011-01-24T20:12:00.000-08:00

"I would say today, we can integrate all religions and races except Islam," he said in "Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going," a new book containing his typically frank views on the city-state and its future.

I find such comments hardly surprising from our controversial Minister Mentor. If we are careful, critical readers we would observe a sort of pattern in what and how our politicians are saying about our community; that every social ill where our community would 'excel' in is framed as a Malay issue and that Malays are 'less integrating' as opposed to other races by virtue of their faith. This brief article aims to expound on the second issue; is it true that Malays are less integrating as opposed to other races by virtue of their faith?

Exploring the meaning of national integration
We define national integration as a synthesis of two terms, ‘national’ and ‘integration’. The word ‘national’ is derived from the word ‘nation’ which means a large group of people inhabiting a place deemed to be their territory, their common land (Vyas, 1993). The word ‘integration’ on the other hand, means a unification of varying perceptions from different people. Hence, the term ‘National Integration’ means ‘a process as well as a goal by which all the people inhabiting in a particular territory irrespective of their religious, ethnic and linguistic differences, on the basis of certain shared traditions, experiences, common history and values strive to live together forever with honour and dignity” (Vyas, 1993).

In a nutshell, national integration is both a process and goal where different communities live together harmoniously by forging a common identity that is shared by all; emphasizing the commonalities that we share. Keyword to note here is share, and there are many things that Muslims share with non-Muslim communities; the love for justice, for peace, for security, for prosperity etc. There are also many things that Muslims don't share with non-Muslim communities; beliefs, worldviews, values, laws etc. and there are many things that Buddhists don't share with Hindus too; they are all different, separate and distinct communities.

To say that Islam cannot integrate with other races and religions is a straw man argument because indefinitely we share many things in common with others to enable us to 'live together forever with honor and dignity' despite our differences in other matters. This is by virtue of the meaning of integration; to say that we are integrating means to relate with different entities. It does not make any sense to integrate the same entities; there must be a difference between one another, and these differences must be maintained and observed to preserve the meaning of the word 'integration', or else we cannot consider it to be integration. We can call this process of something else, probably 'imposing a monolithic way of life', but we cannot call it integration. In fact, the differences and diversity in religious rituals, customs and administration of laws of different ethnic and religious groups should be tolerated as long as they do not “promote enmity between different groups on grounds of religion or race and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony” (Penal Code, 2010).

We encounter another different term - tolerance. And this word is also rooted to differences between communities as well. When we say community A tolerates community B, we mean that this two communities are distinct and separate. If it is the same community then it does not make any sense to use the word 'tolerate'.

In summary, when one says that integration is not possible, by virtue of the meaning of the word, it either means that there is no commonalities shared between the communities or that despite the commonalities shared, there is no way for them to live in honor and dignity with each other. Yet in the context of the Singapore Muslim community, this statement cannot stand.

So what exactly does our MM Lee mean when he speaks of 'national integration'? Obviously 'national integration' in MM Lee's terms do not mean what I have expounded above.

Secular, Secularism and Secularization
Al-Attas defines secularization as the "deliverance of man first from religious and then metaphysical control; as the loosing of the world dispelling of all closed world views, the breaking of all supernatural myths and sacred symbols." Therefore secularization and its ideology, secular-ism,is not just anti-Islam, it is also anti-religion since all religions are by nature closed worldviews, whether Hindu, Buddhist or Christian.

However, what is meant as the secular state of Singapore is not anti-religion since it is clearly expressed in the Constitution the laissez faire attitude of the state towards religion:

(1) Every person has the right to profess and practice his religion and to propagate it.

(2) No person shall be compelled to pay any tax the proceeds of which are specially allocated in whole or in part for the purposes of a religion other than his own.

(3) Every religious group has the right
(a) to manage its own religious affairs;
(b) to establish and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes; and
(c) to acquire and own property and hold and administer it in accordance with law.
(4) This article does not authorize any act contrary to any general law relating to public order, public health or morality. (Article 15 Singapore Constitution)

However, it seems that this is not what is meant by MM Lee:
"I think the Muslims socially do not cause any trouble, but they are distinct and separate," Lee added, calling on the community to "be less strict on Islamic observances."

What does he mean by 'less strict'? This can be clarified in other statements:
"The generation that worked with me - Othman Wok, Rahim Ishak - that was before the wave came sweeping back, sweeing them... We drank beer... we ate together."

"There are nearly 230 million Muslims in Southeast Asia. Nearly all were tolerant and easy to live with. The majority of the 200 million Muslims were 'abangans', Muslims who had fused Islam with Buddhism, Hinduism and other beliefs. They were not the intense and strict Muslim of the Arabs in the Middle East."

So this vision of Singaporean Muslims being 'abangans' is what he meant in his call for Muslims "to be less strict on Islamic observances." And this goes very well in line with the secularization process discussed earlier that is to be imposed on Muslims, to create this new 'abangans' that would fit snugly in his vision of a monolithic Singaporean community that is secular in the anti-religion sense.

And this is not integration.

MM Lee and Islam
In a sense, MM Lee is trying to teach us Muslims how to practise Islam properly. Is he in a position to do so?

Those statements blurted out rather insensitively does reflect the measure of Islamophobia he has in his mind; the assumption that Islam is problematic and that the only way for 'integration' is to secularize them. Additionally, it also reflects the rather superficial understanding of Islam that he has at hand that is probably dominated not by engaging in fruitful discourse but through the demonizing media. This is very well demonstrated in his claims that:

"I came to this conclusion because I live among Muslims.."

as if to imply that his understanding of Islam through living among Muslims is sufficiently enough to substantiate his claims that Islam cannot be 'integrated'. This, my dear friends, is a fallacy. Because even when I live among my Christian, Hindu and Buddhist friends for years, I do not claim that I understand them fully, nor impose on them on how they should practise their faith.

Is Islam not 'integrating'? Of course if 'integration' is meant by the imposing of an anti-religion monolithic way of life, then Islam cannot be integrated with such things, because Islam has its own truth claim as other religions also do. If not 'integrating' means the 5 minutes off work time to perform the obligatory prayers, the refusal for our Muslimah to shake hands with a non-mahram, the observance of modest dress codes, the demand for halal food for example, then this is a trivial argument because it does not interfere with anything that is important to a non-Muslim nor impede religious harmony.

The Islamic civilization that lasted for more than 1000 years was a testament to religious tolerance and harmony; of what integration really means, not in the imposing of an anti-religion monolithic way of life sense. In fact, I can claim in the absolutist sense backed by historical evidence that it was Muslims who taught non-Muslims how to live side by side each other in peace and harmony. MM Lee seems to have forgotten that if it were not for our Malay ancestors who allowed his migrant ancestors from China to come and reside here in peace with us, he would not have told this story. The reason why there are Chinese and Indians living here in the Malay archipelago is that we Malays are open to integration. Do we see Malays living in China and India? Fact is, we don't. Ironically, the Chinese are well known for their xenophobia in the past, and this is substantiated by historical evidence too.

Are Muslims difficult to integrate?
MM Lee blames the Islamic resurgence for making Muslims less 'integrating':

"I think we were progressing very nicely until the surge of Islam came and if you asked me for my observations, the other communities have easier integration -- friends, intermarriages and so on..." he stated.

"But the nature of Islam in Southeast Asia has been changing over the last 30 years. First and foremost, after the price of oil quadrupled in 1973, Saudi Arabia had generously financed the “Dakwa” (missionary) movement by building mosques and religious schools (madrasahs) and paying for preachers (ulamas) throughout the world, spreading the teachings and practices of its austere Wahabi version of Islam. Next, the overthrow of the Shah in Iran in 1979, in a revolution led by Islamic clerics, had made a profound impression on Muslim minds of the power of Islam. Finally, the participation of large numbers of Southeast Asian Muslims in the jihad in Afghanistan during the 1980s and the 1990s has radicalised significant numbers of the Southeast Asian Muslims."

He adds that:

In keeping with a world-wide trend, over the last three decades many Muslims in Singapore and the region are becoming stricter in their dress, diet, religious observances, and even social interaction, especially with non-Muslims. Increasingly Muslim women will not shake hands with men. The generation of convivial and easy-to-get-along-with Muslim leaders in the region has given way to successors who observe a stricter Islamic code of conduct. My original concern was over the growing separateness of our Muslim community, as Singaporean Muslims tended to congregate for their social and extra-mural activities in their mosques, instead of in multi-racial community clubs.

Of course there is some truth in what he is saying with regards to the Islamic resurgence phenomenon, but strangely he used trivial examples to substantiate what he meant by 'non-integrating'. Does the observance of strict dress codes impede national integration? Personally I think such fallacious arguments are meant for younger children, because we are not asking him to observe strict dress codes and live like a proper Muslim. MM Lee expects our Muslim elderly to perform line-dance in community centres as opposed to thinking about their impending death and the Hereafter which is obligatory to the religion, and this sort of argument, this imposing attitude we cannot accept.

Additionally, increasing religious consciousness is a global phenomenon, not just for Muslims. In my campus I think the Christian groups and fellowships are more active than the Muslim Society; they congregate in their bible reading circles and churches. But do we say they are not 'integrating'? Are we seeing double standards here?

Ultimately I believe such arguments stem from the misconception that there are different types of Islam; abangan, strict-Middle-East etc. possibly dominated by an Orientalist study of Islam. Of course we have different schools of thought in metaphysics, in jurisprudence etc. but none of these school of thoughts promote an attitude that is "less strict on Islamic observances". If this 'less strict' attitude is meant as secular in the anti-religion worldly sense then this is contrary to Islam unanimously agreed upon by all schools of thought. This is because religion, as defined by Al-Attas is the "sincere and total submission to God's Will, and this is enacted willingly as absolute obedience to the Law revealed by Him."

Final Notes
So what is national integration? As discussed earlier, national integration must involve separate, distinct communities. National integration must involve commonalities with the goal of living in honor, dignity and harmony.

On the other hand, national integration is not the imposing of an anti-religion monolithic worldly way of life such that it demands a compromise of religious ideals and principles.

National integration is all about tolerance, respect and understanding, and this demands a sincere understanding of the differences between the different communities and living and co-existing with these differences as long as they do not contradict the national goal of living in honor, dignity and harmony.

As a Malay Muslim,despite having more Malay Muslim friends than non-Muslim ones, which is natural, I can dare say that such accusations that I am not integrating enough is unfounded. I live harmoniously beside 3 Chinese neighbours whom my family shares food with, I am the only Malay guy in my undergraduate course in Bioengineering and I participate in some of the block parties organized by the RC in my vicinity. If I had lived an isolated life I clearly would not survive.

And I love this country, God bless Singapura!

Wallahu 'Alam

References:
"Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going" by Lee Kuan Yew
"Islam and Secularism" by Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas
"Keynote address: Cesifo forum 2002" by Lee Kuan Yew
Penal Code
Singapore Constitution
"National Integration and the Law: Burning Issues and Challenges" by Vyas

Merenung Disebalik Ma'na Korban

2011-01-23T04:36:00.000-08:00

Sempena bulan Zulhijjah yang penuh barakah ini saya telah memilih “Ma’na Korban” sebagai tajuk tazkirah yang ingin saya sampaikan kepada sahabat-sahabat yang saya hormati, semoga kita semua dapat meraih manfaat daripada peringatan yang ringkas ini.

Dalam merenung ma’na disebalik istilah ‘korban’, izinkan saya merujuk kepada Kamus Dewan yang mempunyai autoritinya tersendiri dalam merungkai maksud disebalik istilah-istilah dalam Bahasa Melayu. Antara ma’na yang dicatatkan ialah amalan menghampirkan diri kepada Allah dengan menyembelih binatang ternakan dan mengagihkan sebahagian daripada daging itu kepada fakir miskin, pemberian sebagai tanda kebaktian, dan yang paling menarik perhatian saya di sini ialah ma’na korban sebagai seseorang yang menanggung penderitaan akibat sesuatu perbuatan. Kalau ditinjau lagi ma’na yang terakhir ini kita dapat menggambarkan pandangan alam Melayu yang tidak melihat sesuatu penderitaan ataupun kesusahan sebagai suatu kecelakaan meskipun ia melibatkan nyawa sekalipun sebagaimana yang digunakan dalam istilah korban jiwa. Bahkan kalau dikaji dengan cara menghubungkaitkan ma’na yang terakhir tadi dengan ma’na-ma’na yang awalnya,kita dapati betapa serasinya pandangan alam Melayu dengan ajaran Islam tentang konsep taqdir dan pemahaman orang Melayu mengenai kesusahan, dimana kesusahan itu pada pengamatan saya dilihat sebagai sesuatu amalan yang menghampirkan orang yang ditimpa kesusahan itu kepada Allah, sebagai tanda kebaktian dan ketaatan kita kepada Allah S.W.T.

Dengan gambaran yang lebih jelas ini mengenai ta’rif ‘korban’, kita dapati hubungan yang erat antara sang Pencipta dan hamba-Nya, dimana para hamba akan sentiasa diuji dengan pelbagai kesusahan agar dapat diperlihatkan kadar keimanannya kepada Allah S.W.T, yakni sejauh manakah si hamba itu mampu berkorban? Sudah sedia maklum bahawa ramai di antara kita sudahpun dididik mengenai kisah Nabi Ibrahim A.S yang sanggup mengorbankan anaknya Nabi Ismail A.S demi cintanya dan pengabdiannya kepada Allah. Justeru kisah pengorbanan yang klasik ini diabadikan di dalam Al-Qur’an dan juga di dalam Doa Iftitah yang kita ucapkan dalam solat kita sempena doa Nabi Ibrahim:

“Sesungguhnya solatku, dan ibadahku, hidupku, dan matiku, hanya untuk-Mu Ya Rabbi!”

Persoalan yang menghantui fikiran saya: Sanggupkah saya? Apakah pengorbanan yang saya sanggup lakukan demi Allah?

Barangkali ma’na ‘korban’ itu dapat dijelaskan lagi dengan cerita-cerita yang termaktub dalam kitab Kasyful Mahjub karangan Ulama’ Tasawwuf yang tidak asing lagi, Syed Ali bin Uthman Al-Hujweri. Istilah Arabnya disebutkan sebagai ‘ithar, dan pertama sekali yang disebutkannya ialah ayat Qur’an dari Surah Al-Hasyr ayat ke-9 yang bermaksud:

“ Dan orang-orang yang telah menempati kota Madinah (Ansar) dan telah beriman sebelum mereka (Muhajirin), mereka mencintai orang yang berhijrah kepada mereka. Dan mereka tiada menaruh keinginan dalam hati mereka terhadap apa-apa yang diberikan kepada mereka (Muhajirin); dan mereka mengutamakan (orang-orang Muhajirin) atas diri mereka sendiri. Sekalipun mereka memerlukan (apa yang diberikan itu).
Dan siapa yang dipelihara dari kekikiran dirinya, mereka itulah orang-orang yang beruntung.”

Orang Ansar yang dimuliakan Allah ini dimaksudkan Al-Hujweri sebagai Ashabus-Suffah, semoga kita anggota Suffah dapat memahami dan mengamalkan pengorbanan mereka demi sahabat-sahabat yang mereka cintai dan demi menegakkan agama Islam. Di tempat yang lain juga disebutkan tentang kisah pengorbanan Saidina Ali yang sanggup tidur di atas katil Rasulullah semasa Rasulullah melakukan hijrah, dan pengorbanan Abdullah Ibnu Umar yang tersangat ingin makan ikan, lalu terserempak dengan seorang pengemis. Lalu diberikan ikan itu kepada si pengemis, seraya mengungkapkan hadith Rasulullah S.A.W yang berbunyi:
“Sesiapa yang mempunyai keinginan untuk sesuatu lalu ditundukkan keinginan itu demi orang lain, maka dia akan mendapat pengampunan Allah.”

Satu lagi kisah yang dimuatkan juga ialah kisah tiga orang askar yang tercedera di Perang Uhud, dimana apabila seorang daripada mereka didatangi seorang wanita yang ditugaskan memberi air, disuruh wanita itu berikan air itu kepada sahabatnya yang lain, lalu wanita ini bergegas kepada sahabat yang kedua ini. Sahabat ini juga menyuruh wanita itu memberikan air kepada sahabat yang ketiga, justeru wanita ini terus bergegas untuk memberikan air kepada sahabat yang ketiga ini. Sampainya wanita ini kepada sahabat yang ketiga, sahabat ini menyuruh wanita itu untuk memberikan air kepada sahabat yang pertama. Sampainya wanita itu kepada sahabat yang pertama, didapatinya bahawa sahabat yang pertama ini telah syahid. Lalu beliau bergegas kepada sahabat yang kedua,dan didapati bahawa sahabat ini juga turut syahid. Akhir sekali wanita ini bergegas kepada sahabat yang ketiga dan didapatinya bahawa beliau juga turut syahid. Betapa besarnya pengorbanan sahabat-sahabat ini demi cinta mereka terhadap satu sama lain!

Jelaslah bahawa kita ini begitu kerdil untuk melakukan pengorbanan yang begitu besar dilakukan oleh para sahabat Rasulullah. Namun sebagaimana yang dinyatakan di dalam Al-Quran, Allah tiada membebankan seseorang itu diluar kemampuannya. Sebagai seorang pelajar, apakah pengorbanan yang kita dapat lakukan?
Pada peringkat usia ini sudah tentu pengorbanan kita lebih khusus kepada bidang keilmuan. Saya anjurkan kepada diri saya dan sahabat-sahabat untuk mengorbankan waktu dan tenaga yang ada untuk mencari ilmu yang bermanfaat, baik ilmu pengetahuan maupun ilmu pengenalan yakni ma’rifah. Contohilah semangat dan budaya ilmu yang dimiliki sarjana-sarjana silam kita. Sebagai contoh, Ibnu Sina sanggup membaca kitab Aristotle beratus-ratus kali tanpa jemu hanya untuk memahaminya. Al-Jahiz itu menulis begitu banyak kitab sehingga dikatakan bahawa beliau telah menulis kitab yang menyentuh kesemua bidang ilmu yang terdapat pada masanya, dan karangannya yang termasyhur ialah Kitab Al-Hayawan yang menjadi buku rujukan tentang haiwan dan ekologi untuk beratus-ratus tahun. Pelajarilah bahasa asing, terutama sekali bahasa Arab, agar dapat memahami ilmu-ilmu tamadun mereka. Mungkin kalau saudara renungkan hadith Rasulullah yang berbunyi: “Belajarlah hingga ke negeri Cina”, saudara akan dapati bahawa kalau ingin mendalami ilmu tamadun Cina ini haruslah terlebih dahulu melakukan pelbagai persiapan, termasuklah dari segi kewangan dan penguasaan bahasa.

Akhir kata, semoga kita sentiasa aktif dalam merenungkan ma’na-ma’na, baik dalam kitab Al-Qur’an maupun Al-Qur’an yang lebih besar yakni alam semesta ciptaan Allah ini. Amin.

Wallahu ‘Alam

Mensainskan Islam: Istilah Bermasalah

2011-01-16T06:29:00.000-08:00

Saya merujuk kepada artikel BH yang bertajuk 'Mensainskan Islam'. Meskipun ia merupakan suatu makalah yang agak menarik, ada beberapa perkara yang bagi saya memerlukan huraian yang lebih lanjut, terutama sekali penggunaan istilah 'mensainskan Islam'yang bagi saya agak kontroversial. Istilah tersebut seolah-olah memberi gambaran bahawa agama Islam itu sendiri tidak cukup sempurna dan memerlukan sains untuk menyempurnakannya. Malah, ia juga meletakkan sains itu pada peringkat yang lebih tinggi dari segi kebenarannya, justeru perlu kepada agama untuk 'disainskan'.

Harus ditekankan disini bahawa ilmu sains itu bukan neutral ataupun bebas nilai. Malah ia sarat dengan nilai-nilai dari pandangan alam para saintis yang membuat kajian mengenai fenomena alam itu. Menurut Sayyed Hossain Nasr, sains itu adalah suatu aktiviti intelektual yang bersifat 'cultural', lantas sains itu tidak boleh dilihat sebagai kebenaran mutlak kerana kebergantungan aktiviti sains itu pada elemen-elemen kemasyarakatan. Justeru, adalah tidak adil jika sains moden yang sarat dengan nilai-nilai sekular dan banyak berpaksikan metafizika dan falsafah Yunani mengenai alam semesta itu dijadikan kayu pengukur untuk agama Islam yang berpaksikan keTauhidan kepada Allah S.W.T dan bertunjang kepada Wahyu.

Tambahan pula, perlu juga disedari bahawa ilmu sains itu bersifat nisbi ataupun relatif, lantas tidak dapat dijadikan kebenaran mutlak. Penemuan sains sentiasa berubah mengikut peredaran masa. Sebagai contoh, pada suatu masa fenomena cahaya itu dianggap sebagai sejenis gelombang. Beberapa tahun selepas itu pula cahaya dilihat sebagai suatu partikel. Sayugianya, dengan merujuk kepada contoh yang diberikan, sains itu tidak tetap dan tiada pula dapat memberikan keyakinan, malah lebih bersifat dugaan semata-mata. Ini diperakui beberapa sarjana Barat sendiri, terutama sekali Thomas Kuhn dalam kitabnya yang berjudul "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" yang menghuraikan tentang teori-teori sains yang sentiasa berubah mengikut paradigma pemikiran masyarakat sains pada sesuatu zaman.

Menurut Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, sains itu harus dilihat hanya sebagai "a definition of truth." Tujuan sains bukan untuk mencari kebenaran disebabkan beberapa kelemahan pada metodologinya yang bersandarkan pada akal dan pancaindera semata-mata. Sebagaimana yang dinyatakan Imam al-Haramain al-Juwayni, guru besar kepada Hujjatul Islam Imam al-Ghazali, proses pemikiran dan pengintelektualan semata-mata tidak semestinya menghasilkan ilmu. Tujuan sains yang sebenarnya ialah sebagai alat untuk menghuraikan ataupun mensyarahkan Kebenaran yang sudahpun diyakini, yakni kebenaran Wahyu, bukan sebagai jalan kepada kebenaran maupun kayu pengukur kebenaran agama.

Secara kesimpulannya, istilah 'mesainskan Islam' itu harus ditolak. Yang lebih wajar diberikan penekanan ialah 'Islamisasi Ilmu Semasa' yakni penerimaan yang bersifat berhati-hati dan kritikal terhadap ilmu-ilmu yang sarat nilai-nilai dari pandangan alam tamadun lain, terutama sekali tamadun Barat.

Wallahu 'Alam

Kepercayaan Kepada Taqdir Bukan Penghalang Sains

2011-01-16T06:26:00.000-08:00

Saya merujuk kepada pandangan saudara Ahmad Faiz Aidi "Kuasai sains dan teknologi agar maju" yang tersiar pada ruangan Forum (BH, 14 Ogos). Beliau telah mengemukakan beberapa pandangan yang kontroversial dan kurang sesuai dari sudut pandangan alam Islam. Di dalam komentarnya yang singkat, beliau telah mengenalpasti 'keasyikan dalam kepercayaan taqdir' sebagai faktor utama kemunduran umat Islam dari segi sains dan teknologi.

Perlu diketahui bahawa tuduhan terhadap para Mutakallimun yang agung seperti Al-Asy'ari dan Al-Ghazali sebagai tokoh-tokoh agama yang anti-sains ini hanyalah suatu andaian belaka yang didirikan atas hujah-hujah Orientalist yang lemah dan terkeliru. Di dalam kitab "Al-Munqidh Min Al-Dalal" karangan Al-Ghazali, Imam Al-Ghazali menyebutkan bahawa para Mutakallimun tidak menolak pendekatan rasional terhadap agama, malah bertindak untuk mempertahankan sunnah dan agama dengan menunjukkan kekurangan logik dalam hujah dan premis puak Mu'tazilah dan Falasifah. Di dalam polemik mereka terhadap golongan yang telah membuat beberapa kesilapan fundamental dari segi aqidah ini, para Mutakallimun menekankan bahawa fenomena kausal tabii di pelbagai tahap adalah sentiasa berpunca terus dari Tuhan. Fenomena tabii tidak mempunyai kudrat tersendiri dan tidak terputus atau terbiar daripada kudrat Illahi. Justeru, Tuhan mempunyai kuasa mutlak atas segala sesuatu. Api yang membakar kapas bukan kerana api itu mempunyai kuasa untuk membakar secara tersendiri, tetapi kerana Tuhanlah yang mengizinkan fenomena pembakaran itu berlaku. Namun, pada masa yang sama, ini tidak bermakna bahawa kepercayaan sebegini akan menjadikan seseorang itu mempunyai pandangan yang fatalistik terhadap kehidupan.

Seyugianya, pandangan bahawa para Mutakallimun ini bersikap anti-sains adalah suatu penyalahtafsiran dan rumusan puak Orientalist seperti Sarton dan Wiet yang simplistik terhadap doktrin-doktrin yang para Mutakallimun pertahankan secara aqliah dan saintifik. Para Mutakallimun tidak mengatakan bahawa dengan kepercayaan terhadap kuasa mutlak Tuhan atas segala sesuatu maka kita harus berhenti mengkaji fenomena alam. Bahkan, di dalam kitab "Ihya Ulumuddin", Imam Al-Ghazali telah menyenaraikan ilmu aqliah, termasuk sains, sebagai ilmu fardhu kifayah, di mana jika masyarakat gagal menghasilkan pakar-pakar yang mencukupi dalam bidang-bidang ini maka ia akan mendatangkan kemudaratan terhadap masyarakat itu. Justeru, para Mutakallimun tidak menolak sains, namun sebaliknya bertindak untuk meletakkan ilmu sains dan falsafah itu pada tempatnya yang wajar, sekadar sebagai alat bagi mensyarahkan kebenaran wahyu yang telahpun diyakini dan bukan alternatif bagi wahyu.

Di dalam ceramah Timothy Winter, sarjana Cambridge tersohor dalam bidang Falsafah Islam tiga tahun yang lalu, beliau menegaskan bahawa karya ilmiah Al-Ghazali bukan penyebab kemunduran sains di dalam dunia Islam. Malah, dibuktikan di dalam sejarah tamadun Islam bahawa setelah tertulisnya kitab Tahafut Al-Falasifah bagi menerangkan kesilapan para Failasuf dalam bidang metafizika, umat Islam masih rancak menghasilkan tokoh-tokoh sains dan teknologi yang tersohor seperti Al-Jazari dan Ibn Al-Baitar. Tambahan pula, jatuhnya kota Konstantinople kepada tangan umat Islam dijalankan dengan senjata yang paling canggih dunia Eropah pernah saksikan pada waktu itu.

Menurut kajian Salah Zemeiche di dalam makalahnya "Fallacies Surrounding the Decline of Muslim Civilization", beliau menolak hujah Orientalist yang mengatakan bahawa kemunduran umat disebabkan kepercayaan umat terhadap Islam dan doktrin Mutakallimun. Sebaliknya, beliau mengetengahkan beberapa faktor yang lebih kuat. Antaranya ialah kelemahan politik dan ekonomi umat Islam sejak kejatuhan Baghdad dan Al-Andalus,yang menyebabkan suasana yang kurang sihat untuk berfikir dan melakukan kegiatan saintifik. Tambahan pula, menurut Hairudin Harun, kelemahan institusi sains akibat tidak mendapat sokongan dan tajaan pemerintah Islam yang lebih tertumpu kepada perkara-perkara material dan hiburan turut menjadi faktor yang lain. Tambahan juga, menurut Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, ialah munculnya para ulama' yang kurang berwibawa, yang telah menyempitkan pemahaman agama hanya pada perkara-perkara yang bersifat perundangan dan peribadatan.

Secara tuntasnya, kepercayaan terhadap kuasa mutlak Allah S.W.T tidak menghalang seseorang Muslim itu untuk membuat kajian terhadap fenomena alam tabii. Berbekalkan cabaran Al-Qur'an kepada manusia untuk memikirkan tentang alam ciptaan Allah sebagai tanda kewujudan dan kekuasaannya, pemahaman pandangan alam Islam yang benar dan tepat serta suasana berfikir yang sihat dan menggalakkan, masyarakat Islam mampu menghasilkan tokoh-tokoh seperti yang terdahulu. Pada masa yang sama, kita juga seharusnya menolak pandangan ekstrem yang mempertuhankan aqal dan sains sebagai pengukur kemajuan dan kebenaran. Persoalan yang selanjutnya yang perlu difikirkan ialah ialah: Apakah takrif kemajuan yang sebenar? Adakah dengan kemajuan sains dan teknologi semata-mata, manusia itu maju? Mungkin persoalan ini boleh dijawab di dalam "Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam" karya Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas.

Wallahu 'Alam

Islam and Postmodernism

2011-01-16T06:17:00.000-08:00

I am writing this because there is this notion that postmodernism and Islam can coexist, and that the term "Postmodern Muslim" is a valid term that can be used. This is a short summary written in a FAQ form which perhaps can be used as guide the sincere seeker of Truth.

What is Postmodernism?

Postmodernist thinkers themselves cannot agree on what postmodernism is. We will thus have to examine the views of two of the most authoritative thinkers of postmodernism in explaining what may constitute as postmodernism as an ideology.

According to Lyotard, postmodernism is a sceptic worldview against Grand Narratives and the argument for a diversity of narratives where not one narrative can dominate. In the words of Foucault, "there is no truth with a capital T"; there is no Universal Truth out there. All there is are stories or interpretations of the truth that is shaped by the community and society propagating it.

According to Baudrillard, postmodernism is the passive surrender of consumerist Man to the images that are bombarded onto them through various sources and channels of the media. In other words, images like Coke or Pepsi ads that pervade the media now becomes the reality of people living in urban centres. Reality is not what is objectively out there; it is created to satisfy our capitalist cravings and needs.

In summary, the postmodernist assert that our view of reality isn't as real as it once seemed. We have come to realise that there is not one reality but many different, often conflicting realities. We have come to see that ideas about truth are not eternal, but made. The ideas that only God is Yahweh or Allah, or the Goddess, or that some god named Bumba vomited the Moon and stars, or the scientific notion that the Moon is a physical body of such and such mass, or that Caucasian race is the master race- all these are man-made notions. They are inventions- they are social constructs.

Therefore the postmodernist, instead of dreaming of the day when all the world is united under the universal banner of Marxism or Christianity or Science, are more interested in seeing the world as a kind of carnival of cultures- a tribal gathering. The postmodern society does not mind if one story says that the Moon and Stars were vomited forth, or another story proclaims that the moon and stars were created by God. Postmodern audiences don't demand heterogeneous stories adding up to some grand, global, universal sense; they celebrate the fact that it's OK to stop making much sense. Because inevitably all our rituals, religious dogmas, myths, gender roles, self-concepts, beliefs, histories and theories are cultural, social inventions. As such, postmodernism also encourages participating in more than one Grand Narrative; its OK to be a Buddhist Christian!

What do our Muslim luminaries say about this postmodernist attitude?

How different are the postmodernists from the Sophists mentioned by the scholars of the past,the intellectual adversaries of Islam? The answer is, actually there isn't much difference. As mentioned by Imam Al-Ghazali, "once the real meaning is understood,there is no need to quibble over names".

The Sophists were mentioned in the authoritative text of the Muslims, "Aqa'id Al-Nasafi", by the grand imam Umar Ibn Muhammad Al-Nasafi,in paragraph 3:

"The People of Reality- may Allah honour them forever- say "The realities of things are established in their existence and the knowledge of them is certain in contradiction to the Sophist."

This authoritative text is commented on by Al-Taftahzani, who further classified the Sophists into three categories:
1) The Relativists (Al-indiyyah)
2) The Sceptics (Al-inadiyyah)
3) The Agnostics (La Adriyyah)

The Relativists believe that everything is subjective according to context. There is no Absolute Truth established out there because everything in subjective to interpretation. The Sceptics believe that everything must necessarily be cast in doubt following the assumption that there is no Universal Truth. The Agnostics believe that since everything cannot be known in certainty, therefore it follows that one should just be content in one's ignorance and celebrate the diversity of opinions, whether true or false.

So how different are the Postmodernists to the Sophists who:
1) Believe that there isn't a Universal, Objective Truth and Reality out there.
2) Believe that reality and narratives are social constructs that must be cast in suspicion and scepticism.
3) Believe that because there are so many interpretations of the truth whose objectivity cannot be determined, it is OK to celebrate the diversity of opinions?

What should the Muslim attitude towards postmodernism be?

I am not suggesting that everything is postmodernism is absurd and wrong and that we should not read postmodernist material because they are dead wrong :p I am suggesting that we should be critical; we must necessarily reject the axioms of postmodernism that would affect our aqidah. At the same time I think that postmodernist material is particularly useful in understanding the human (Western) condition in the modern era; of how nowadays we are so fixated to our television and computer screens thinking that the images they show is reality, about how many of us used to believe that Science is an objective description of reality only to know that it is itself a social construct, about how information is controlled by those who are in power etc. And what postmodernists say also help to debunk some stereotypes concerning Muslims and their history too.

We reject postmodernism as a philosophical programme that challenges our aqidah. This means we reject the notion that everything are social constructs, because if it were the case then the Quran is not Divine anymore and that our fundamental concepts that constitute our worldview would be rendered meaningless because all of them are but social constructs established by those who were in power. This is particularly erroneous because the Quran and the Sunnah are revealed to us by Allah s.w.t, safeguarded from error by a mutawatir chain of narrators who are pious and sincere. This source of knowledge is known to us as Khabar Sadiq, that is, true report that is successively transmitted upon the tongues of people whom reason cannot conceive that they would purpose together on a lie, and the report of the Messenger of Allah confirmed by miracle.

Following the fact that the Holy Quran is objectively established by Allah and transmitted to us by the Prophet and on the tongues of the sincere, we necessarily reject the notion that there is no objective truth out there. Because if there were no objective truth, then the religion of Islam is reduced to that of a social construct, that Islam is a partial (human-created) truth that must be supplemented by other human-created thoughts and ideologies, that Islam is not the Absolute Truth.

Postmodernism stops short at denying the truth of all Grand Narratives. As a Muslim, while we deny all other Grand Narratives, we proceed by declaring the Oneness of Allah and the Truth in His Religion. That is why our first pillar of Iman is to declare our Syahadah:

"There are no gods....but Allah,and Muhammad is His Messenger."

"And whoever seeks a religion (ideology) other than Islam, it will never be accepted of Him, and in the Hereafter he will be among the losers." 3:85

So is there such a thing called the "Postmodernist Muslim"?

The term itself is a paradox. Its like saying "colourless green ideas sleeps furiously"; a term that lacks meaning and hence isn't a term at all. A Muslim is a Muslim and a Postmodernist is a Postmodernist. However, there is no harm learning and appreciating postmodernism as long as we are critical enough to discern its truth from its falsehood.

"Oh Believers! Embrace Islam in its totality, and do not follow the footsteps of Syaithan. Verily Syaithan is your apparent enemy." 2:208-209

Wallahu 'Alam

Muslims and Science: Schools of thought

2011-01-16T06:09:00.001-08:00

This is a summary of the various ways in which Muslims perceive science in relation to Islam, which I hope would be of benefit to some of you. Most of it is taken from my own observations in the contemporary writings of Muslims with regards to science, and special references to the articles by Dr Adi Setia and I. Kalic. Do note that the term 'science' here refers strictly only to the systematic investigation of natural phenomena, as it is popularly known by the masses.

1. Historical view of Islamic Science
In this school of thought, Islamic science is viewed from a historical perspective that is somewhat detached from the realities of secular science as taught in schools today.They are classified into 2 groups:

a. The formal academic discipline that "studies the history of the development of empirical science and technology in Islamic Civilization in history" vis-a-vis sciences of earlier civilizations (Greeks, Indians etc.) and later ones (Europe). This view reduces Islamic science to the act of romanticizing and glorifying the works of scholars like Ibn Haiytham, Ibn Sina, Al-Jazari etc. Discourses are very much focused on the extent of Muslim contribution in the past to the world and fixated on historical trivia like "Muslims invented the toothbrush first",with the intent of inspiring today's generation of Muslims to be active participants in modern scientific and technological endeavours, to emulate or revive the spirit of the past, without considering the epistemological and metaphysical implications of modern science to Muslim thought. As such, this view looks at the history of science in a linear fashion, as if science is neutral and is passively passed on from the Greeks and the Indians to the Muslims, and then to the Europeans,without taking into account the differences in epistemology and metaphysics that is actually very significant between the different civilizations.

b. The formal academic discipline that "pertains to the subject matter of the sub-discipline in Islamic Philosophy that serves to describe and clarify in objective, contemporary terms the methodological and philosophical principles that have guided or undergirded the cultivation of the sciences in Islamic civilization. This meaning renders Islamic science as part of philosophy and philosophy of science in general, and focuses more on the conceptual or intellectual rather than the empirical, practical or artifactual aspects of Islamic science." This view of Islamic Science, however useful, stops short at the conceptual and philosophical level detached from contemporary realities, without recommending any framework or program of science that can be applied to modern day context as part of our ijtihad against the backdrop of contemporary challenges.

2. Epistemological view of Islamic Science
In this school of thought, science is examined in terms of its usefulness as a body of knowledge, or in terms of its nature in Man's ways to know. There are two largely divergent sub schools of thought that view Islamic Science as a problem of epistemology, and they are:

c. The first view is a positive view of modern science, observed to be the most popular view of Islamic Science especially here in Singapore. In this view, also to be known as Bucailism following the works of Maurice Bucaille, the Muslim scientist-scholar seeks to justapose the Quran and the religion with the recent discoveries of modern science. By subjecting selective Quranic verses to empirical scrutiny and successfully demonstrating that those verses are in line with some modern scientific facts, they believe that they have 'proven' some Quranic 'scientific miracles' that preceded modern science. They argue that since these scientific facts are in the Quran and the Quran revealed these things some 1400 years ago, the Quran actually predicts these facts much earlier before modern scientists like Einstein did. This would then demonstrate the Quran as the Word of God. Other variations of this school of thought include examining the health benefits of certain rituals as indicated in the recent book on solat and its health benefits, and its more extreme variation that is fixated on empirical understanding of the Ghayb, seen in the works of some scientists who seek to study things like the temperature of hell-fire and the speed of angels etc. As such, modern science is to be totally embraced without criticism and scrutiny, as if it is neutral and value-free, since it always and will always be in line with the religion. And in response to some who challenge the validity of modern science and technology which has brought down upon us this modern day crisis such as the environmental problems, proponents of this school of thought propose ad-hoc, patchwork solutions as if the crisis is a problem of personal ethics and not one that is systemic in nature.

This view, though seen as a popular medium of da'wah among some religious teachers, is rather problematic because it stems from the implicit and rather unconscious premise that the Qur'an must be proven empirically as the Word of God, as if the Quran's status as divine revelation is already cast in doubt similar to that of the Bible. This unfortunately shows that the disease of doubt in the West has infected the minds of the Muslims today, when Muslims have actually no such problems, in view of the historical fact of how the precision,accuracy and meanings of the Quran revealed to our Master Rasulullah S.A.W is safeguarded by many intellectual mechanisms that were formulated by our predecessors. Additionally, this view neglects the everchanging, relative, value-laden nature of science, demonstrating their failure in looking at science from a deeper philosophical perspective.

d. The second view is a negative sociological view of modern science very much in contrast with the first. This school of thought borrows its arguments from postmodernist thinkers such as Lyotard and Kuhn, demonstrating the value-laden, subjective, speculative nature of modern science. As such, science is no longer an arbiter of objective truth. Science is subjective because interpretation of scientific data is never separate from some a priori assumptions and beliefs that are held by the scientist studying those natural phenomena; the worldview of the scientist. If the scientist is a secularist and Darwinist/Newtonian, then it follows that his observations and theories will include those elements from the secular, Darwinist/Newtonian worldview. The fact that scientific theories are continually being replaced by later findings demonstrate the ever-changing premise of science too. Therefore, it is suggested that Muslims must be critical of modern science. They must be equipped with sufficient knowledge of the religion to discriminate between true findings and false ones. This view of science, however useful, can be seen as reactive as opposed to proactive. Islamization of modern science can only occur from the outside because this view lacks the intrinsic building blocks from which a suitable scientific program can be formulated and applied.

3. Metaphysical view of science
This last view of science follows from the previous epistemological view of science, but provides the intrinsic building blocks from which a proper program of Islamic science and technology can be realised. These building blocks are the metaphysics of Islam, which in the past was "largely undertaken within the more general disciplinary frameworks of falsafah, kalam and hikmah". Because any theory of science rests on a more general theory or axiom, and the most general theory is the theory of reality, which Muslims derive from the metaphysics of Islam. This view of Islamic science necessitates the reading of history and philosophy of Islamic science as programmatic in nature so that we can "build the capacity to construct and cultivate a new, contemporarily relevant Islamic science and Technology that, on the one hand, will manifest and realize our value system and hence directed toward fulfilling our physical, emotional and spiritual needs, and, on the other, engage constructively with Western modern science and technology". In this way, Islamization of modern science occurs from the inside; with the understanding of metaphysics we can then creatively formulate our own scientific theories (as opposed to passive surrender to the findings of others) and empirical studies supporting the metaphysical framework in place, and to formulate a suitable theory of technology management that is in accordance to our principles of jurisprudence (maqasid syariah).

This is the view taken by our teacher, Prof. Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, as well as other scholars such as S.H Nasr and Alparsalan Acingenck.

Wallahu 'Alam

Biology and Islamisation

2011-01-14T00:03:00.000-08:00

"Our present engagement is with the challenges of an alien worldview surreptitiously introduced into Muslim thought and belief by confused modernist Muslim scholars, intellectuals, academics, writers and their followers, as well as by religious deviationists and extremists of many sorts. They have unwittingly come under the spell of modern secular Western philosophy and science, its technology and ideology which have disseminated a global contagion of secularization as a philosophical program. We are not unaware of the fact that not all of Western science and technology are necessarily objectionable to religion; but this does not mean that we have to uncritically accept the scientific and philosophical theories that go along with the science and the technology themselves, without first understanding their implications and testing the validity of the values that accompany the theories. Islam possesses within itself the source of its claim to truth and does not need scientific and philosophical theories to justify such a claim." (Al-Attas, 2001)

Modern secular biology can be defined as the teleological study of biological phenomena comprising of laws and classification of biological entities within an ecological system that operates within an Aristotelian framework of causality. Putting this simply, the secular approach to biology assumes that final causes end in nature itself; that nature runs on its own laws due to potentialities inherent in the physics and chemistry of atoms and molecules in a living thing or system. This means that a thing is alive and has certain characteristics solely because of the physical and chemical arrangement and mechanism of atoms and molecules in the basic unit of life known as the cell. Hence, secular biology effectively denies the role of God in nature as it seeks to provide a logical explanation of why and how living things react or behave in a certain way through natural 'laws'; Mendel laws, Hardy-Weinberg law and the law of natural selection - axioms of secular biology. Additionally, many modern textbooks on biology accept the 'scientific fact' of human evolution. This dogmatic acceptance is rather strange, because science stops when you stop challenging your beliefs! These axioms of biology is appropriately covered by Durali in his essay in honor of Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas Feschrift.

While as Muslims we do not deny a rational approach towards understanding nature, we cannot accept this definition of biology because this assumes that the universe is a mechanistic universe; a self-sustaining machine that can run on its own without the need of a God, as Weber and Al-Attas puts it, the disenchantment of nature. We believe that God is always Omnipresent and Active, consistently creating, annihilating and re-creating the universe, and that such natural laws only reflect the customary habits of God (sunnatullah) of which He can suspend the laws of nature as and when He likes (Occasionalism). This is in opposition to the Newtonian theological view of a passive God that creates these natural laws and let them run on its own while He seemingly 'sleeps' afterwards.

Additionally, this objectification of nature has led to many environmental and ecological problems that have surfaced in modern times, because nature is viewed as a mere object that is to be studied and manipulated to suit human wants and desires. Nature is no longer viewed as a sacred object or a symbol reflecting God's Magnificence, Justice and Wisdom, and therefore is open to atrocities of modern Man in his insatiable thirst to satisfy unlimited wants defined by modern secular economics. Schuon attacks this secular approach to nature, arguing that it is mindless fact-gathering endeavor devoid of meaning and wisdom, because contemplation of nature which would result in Man realising his true role as a steward for nature is absent in what is to be known as a 'scientific' activity.

So how exactly should we Muslims respond to this? I am not suggesting a Luddite approach such that we should burn away all those textbooks and reject all findings by scientists. I am suggesting that we should be more critical of things and their underlying assumptions. We need a redefinition of biology such that our creative energies put into our contemplation and study of nature would be more in line with our values as a Muslim. As mentioned by Al-Attas, education is:

the recognition and acknowledgement, progressively instilled into man, of the proper places of things in the order of creation, such that it leads to the recognition of God in the order of being and existence.

Perhaps we can explore a systematic redefinition of biology in my next exposition on this subject matter. Wallahu 'Alam.

Jingle Bells, Anyone?

2010-12-22T06:22:00.000-08:00

As we approach the end of the year, television and all other media channels simply burst into colour and action, bombarding us with advertisements and shopping discounts geared towards satisfying our capitalist cravings, as radio stations and loudspeakers in shopping malls blare out empty promises of happiness in merry-making and in the holidays and Orchard Road lights up in such brilliance never seen before in any other month of the year. It's the holiday season they say; Jingle Bells and White Christmas become the anthem of the people, as if snow would fall onto this tropical country and reindeers would survive the heat and rain of the unpredictable North-East Monsoon. Amidst all these summons for celebration, do we as Muslims understand the origins and implications of such festivities?

Firstly, if we desire to step up to the national aspiration of developing critical thinkers in thinking schools, we should question, why should this month be considered as end of the year? If you can sense that this notion of end-of-the-year is rather arbitrary, you are one step closer to graduating from the real school of critical thinking. Well done!

The holiday seasons follow the ancient Roman solar calender known as the Julian calender, declared by Caesar himself, coinciding with the Winter Solstice period of the year in which poor preparations for harsh cold conditions may result in starvation. As such, 1 January was arbitrarily declared the start of the new year in honor of the rebirth of the Sun God, Sol Invictus (from this sun worship worldview is also where Sunday is arbitrarily declared the end of the week for holiday and rest). Prior to the Winter Solstice is a period of merry-making known as Saturnalia where the poet Catullus describes Saturnalia as the best of days. It was a time of celebration, visits to friends, and gift-giving, particularly of wax candles, and earthenware figurines (like our modern day toys?). Additionally it was also a time where the temporary reversal of roles are observed; Masters served meals to their slaves who were permitted the unaccustomed luxuries of leisure and gambling. Clothing was relaxed and included the peaked woollen cap that symbolized the freed slave, which looks an awful lot like Santa Claus's peaked red hat . A member of the familia (family plus slaves) was appointed Lord of Misrule, and as the name suggests, they were in charge of chaos and disorder. Perhaps this was their idea of fun? God knows. Sometimes celebrations grew out of hand to the extent that some Roman Emperors actually attempted, in vain, to shorten the festivities to three or five days. These festivities were eventually christianised with the coming of Christianity in Rome to what we observe today.

But how do some of our history-illiterate Muslim brothers and sisters respond? I breathed in some oxygen molecules of exasperation and disappointment. We may live in the 21st Century as independent people but our minds and habits are still held captive, enslaved by our Colonial masters in compounded ignorance (jahil murakkab). Some say that slavery was eradicated by the 20th Century, yet we still see today two types of slavery; of the mind and of the desires (nafs). We will continue to remain enslaved by these things unless we are prepared to Islamize ourselves in thought and soul; as mentioned by Al-Attas, Islamization is a liberating process to becoming the man of Islam whose reason and language is no longer controlled by magic, mythology, animism, his own national and cultural traditions and secularism. As such, Islamization refers to a man's progress towards realization of his original nature as spirit, and this is exactly what our festivities of Eidul Fitr and Eidul Adha in Islam represent; our ascent towards recalling our true nature (fitra) and of the Primordial Covenant we once took to witness Allah as our Lord in the realm of the souls, as opposed to those drunken merry-making intended to forget!

Well I'm not exactly suggesting we should do away with the Gregorian-Julian civil calender and go out with arrows aimed at some poor merry-making reindeer. We should at least be aware of the calender and the holiday season's origins and be prepared to engage with them constructively. Let me suggest to you something better; let's give ourselves and others the gift of a better understanding of our religion, shall we? Let's jingle the bells of our hearts and minds with the knowledge of Islam and its worldview.

Rangkaian Ruba'iyat of Prof. Al-Attas Part Three

2010-12-07T15:55:00.001-08:00

III
Hai Ruh!—dari dangkal debu ’pabila merdeka,
S’umpama sukma bebas kau lelangit menghala;
Singgasanamu diangkasa bersama Dewa,
Tak malu kau—lama dalam lempung terpenjara!

Oh spirit!- from the banal earth you gain independance,
Like a soul free to wander towards the skies,
Your place is in the heavens with the Divine,
Aren't you ashamed- long in this cocoon imprisoned!

The Holy Qur'an mentions that the nature of the spirit cannot be known except very little. As such, this part of Al-Attas' Ruba'iyat perhaps is an attempt to describe the general attributes of the spirit in a metaphorical sense, and one of it is that it is not limited or confined to the spatio-temporal physical world that we live in. These things of the Ghayb or Unseen, like the spirit, the jin, heaven and hell etc. are beyond sensory perception and falls under the articles of faith. They are a Reality that must be believed by the Muslim without demonstration since they are reported to us in the Qur'an and there is no doubt that the Qur'an is from Allah S.WT.

In one sense, Prof. Al-Attas is refuting the Aristotelian view that the spirit, despite existing, will perish together with the body. In fact, as the body perishes in the "banal earth" it becomes liberated from the confines of the physical world.

What is meant by the spirit's place with the Divine is possibly a description of the spirit's 'eternal' characteristic in relation to the temporal nature of the physical body. This refutes Ibn Sina's view that the body was created before the spirit.

The last stanza is probably derived from the prophetic hadith "The Dunya is a prison for the Mu'min". This, however, is not to be confused with the Christian view that the world is profane. This world is to be treated sacredly because it is a sign or a symbol that points to its Creator, where the Qur'an calls men to reflect and contemplate on it. This world consists of Allah's creations which the Qur'an describes as constantly "singing praises for Him." This respectful worldview towards nature is unfortunately not shared by modern science, possibly deriving from the view that the world is profane, seek to conquer and exploit it, leading to the unprecedented environmental corruption never seen before in human history. So can we say that we have progressed?

This world is important as well, because it is where we plant our crops so that we can harvest them in the hereafter. Which is why when we pray, we pray for the goodness in this world first, and then the goodness in the hereafter, because without this world it is difficult to transit to the next safely. Without food we become to weak to perform ibadah, without money we cannot perform the zakat and hajj. What Islam is opposed is al-hayat al-dunya, the life of this world, that is, being too preoccupied and attached to this world to the extent we forget the next!

What is meant by "this world is a prison for the mu'min" is that it is an expression of intense love to be reunited with the Creator. In Sufi literature, once one is acquainted with the love of God, the pangs of separation become unbearable, which is why they describe this world as a prison. Therefore, this prophetic hadith should be treated in a metaphorical sense as opposed to a literal interpretation.

Wallahu 'Alam

Rangkaian Ruba'iyat of Prof. Al-Attas Part Two

2010-12-07T03:51:00.001-08:00

II
Perkataan dan perbuatan jalanan zahir,
Jalanan batin melintasi langit mendesir;
Jasad menempuh jalanannya yang penuh debu—
Ruh berjalan, seperti ‘ Isa, diatas air.

Words and actions are physical journeys,
Spiritual journeys transcend beyond the murmuring sky,
The physical go through this dusty journey-
The soul walks, like Jesus, on water.

The nature of man, according to Islam, is a dual nature consisting of the physical body and the spiritual soul, in opposition to the secular anthropological and psychological view where man is only investigated by virtue of their physical and psychological condition. Thus we have the animal soul attached to the physical world known as nafs al-haywaniyyah and the rational soul known as nafs al-natiqah, where our condition of returning to our Creator depends on which is in control over our lives.

In one aspect, Prof. Al-Attas shares the same view as Al-Ghazali in his social critique of Muslims, where a preoccupation over rituals-laws and disputations while ignoring the spiritual dimension of religion would ultimately restrict the true potential of the human spirit which "transcends beyond the murmuring sky." While Al-Ghazali refers his critique to some of the mutakallimun, Al-Attas probably refers this reductionist attitude to the Wahabbis and the Orientalists, who study Islam not because they want to benefit from its light but purely as an intellectual exercise.

The human physical body does not last two atoms of time; it is consistently created, annihilated and re-created. And when the individual finally tastes death, his body will decay and turn to dust, but his spirit endures, waiting for the day of judgment. The term 'Jesus' is used perhaps to remind his readers of the end of days where Jesus, now in the spirit domain, will be manifested again signalling the end of time and the temporal nature of this world. This is in opposition to the view of secular biologist who defined life as the stopping of biological function and the materialists denial of the end of days.

In this respect, Prof. Al-Attas probably intended to remind his readers on the temporal nature of life and the certainty of death. Are we prepared to meet our Creator? In what state will we meet Him? Will it be with dust on our faces, or with water at our feet?

Wallahu 'Alam

Rangkaian Ruba'iyat of Prof. Al-Attas - A Commentary

2010-12-06T04:32:00.000-08:00

Do note that this is the writer's personal interpretation of the poem and therefore is no way authoritative:

Ada hakikat difahami dengan samadi,

Ada Hakikat pada akal tak ’kan mengabdi;

Samudera suram dan luas tak tampak dasarnya—

Tapi mudah mata menembus air dikendi.

There are truths that are understood through meditation,

There is Truth that reason cannot follow,

The sombre and wide ocean (we) cannot see it's floor-

But easy for the eye to see through the water in a jug.

The Professor comments on the two types of truth in Islamic epistemology: 'ilm (knowledge) and ma'rifah (gnosis). The former is analogous to observing a person externally, for instance, his height, how he looks like, where does he live etc. Kinda like those information you can retrieve from Facebook profiles. The latter, on the other hand, is a more personal relationship; to know the person as he really is, where he shares with you his secrets and stories. This is ma'rifah, a higher type of knowledge where God reveals Himself to His obedient servant and shares His Secrets with regards to the true nature of existence, as opposed to knowing God through His creations and signs, be it the Divine Word of God which is the Qur'an or by contemplation and reflection of nature where we would know his Attributes and Names.

The heart is the seat of knowledge as opposed to the brain. Islam recognizes the symbiotic relationship between the intellect where intuition arises, and reason where we form causal relationships in our attempt to understand nature; we do not separate nor deny any of the two. In fact, healthy reason submits to intuition and revelation; it is but a tool to clarify Divine truths and will never be in opposition to it. Where conflict arises between reason and intuition-revelation, in essence it is not really in conflict with one another but rather because of the limitations of reason. Reason alone cannot comprehend Divine Truth. In fact theoretical physicists and some philosophers find it difficult to reconcile reason with the paradoxical universe we live in; is light a particle or a wave? Why is it that when we know the momentum of a particle we cannot know with certainty it's position and vice versa? How do we reconcile between predetermination and freewill?

These things, according to The Professor, fall not in the domain of reason-sensory. Unfortunately, modern science denies metaphysical proofs achieved by intuition and manifested in Revelation. They say that something is true only if it can be sensed by the sensory perception.This sort of science restricts itself only to the phenomenal world, looking at objects in nature as if they are the ends in itself. In Islam, objects of nature are not studied only by virtue of its apparent logical structure, of quantification of physical 'laws' and of the practical applications of this information; we study these things as symbols or signs that point to a higher Reality. When we say Einstein is intelligent, we don't say that he is smart because of the superior weight of his brain; we look at the positive contributions he has made to the realm of theoretical physics, and this is intangible. Such a reductionist approach only serves to alienate Man from the true meaning of nature and of existence. You cannot put the infinite into something finite like reason, especially in comprehending the true nature of God and Existence.

The Professor suggests that the study of the true nature of things fall under the domain of spiritual experience. The Sufis developed this scientific technique of meditation and disciplining the soul so that ma'rifah is achieved. Sufism, therefore, is not music and dancing as wrongly understood by some. It is a scientific method aimed at disciplining the soul so that the pure heart is made ready to comprehend Divine Truths.

Unfortunately people today talk of Divine Truths and Secrets and metaphysics as if they comprehend these things properly. Some write at length of Ibn Arabi's spiritual experiences as if they have experienced these things. These charlatans only serve to confuse rather than clarify. Their interpretations are speculative, not of haqqul yaqin.

Wallahu 'Alam

"To be a Modern Muslim." What does that mean?

2010-12-02T18:08:00.000-08:00

Perhaps you may have encountered the term ‘Modern Muslim’ or the slogan ‘To be a Modern Muslim’. This has somewhat been the mantra chanted by those modernisation witchdoctors, whose intent of portraying the Muslim as having elements that are progressive, advanced and competitive. These three terms, when combined together, does sound a bit like a good television commercial doesn’t it?

But what exactly is the meaning behind the term ‘Modern Muslim’? To what extent is this term appropriate? According to Al-Attas, language is an instrument of reasoning. As such, terms that are utilized would give a brief picture of one’s understanding of a certain issue. Therefore, what is it that we can understand from the term ‘modern’ when it is combined with the term ‘Muslim’, or to the term ‘Man’ in ‘Modern Man’?

In “Islam and Secularism” and “Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam” by Al-Attas, I can summarize the explanation of the term ‘modern’ into three points in the Western civilization. The first is the Western view of the history of civilization. The second is the Western view with regards to the reality of Man. The third is the Western concept of time. In this brief article, I aim to clarify only the first point. Insya-Allah given another opportunity I will clarify the second and the third point.

According to Western scholars of history, with the exception of those holding on to a postmodernist view of history, generally the history of civilization can be classified into four important periods: the Classical period, the Dark Ages, the Enlightenment period and subsequently the Modern period. In summary, the Classical Period refers to the ancient Greek civilization, with their sophistication in philosophy largely stemming from two major schools of thought; Aristotle and Plato. Subsequently, the Dark Ages, just as we can easily understand the term ‘dark’, refers to the darkness that the West experienced due to the oppression of the Church in almost all fields; socio-politic and economy, as well as the stagnant thought coming from the exclusive interpretation of the Bible by its priests. This period is highlighted by the negative attitudes of the Church against the empirical findings of scientists, which it felt were challenging their dominance as leaders of the West and shaking the very foundations of Christian beliefs. With that, the period is known as the Dark Age, because of the darkness that the Christian religion had brought onto Man, which continually sought to suppress the light of science and philosophy. When the West was finally able to liberate themselves from the clutches of religion and revelation, they call it enlightenment; because finally they were able to be enlightened by the light of science and philosophy. It is through this process that we encounter the terms ‘secular’, ’secularism’ and ‘secularization’, to give the impression of the disappointment of the West in general of the role of religion. This is because the meaning of the term ‘secular’ actually relates to the worldly or profane masses, who eventually triumphed over the sacred Church.

With that, it becomes apparent to us the Western attitude in general towards religion,which is seen as the source of ignorance and oppression. The Enlightenment period is also called the Rennaisance, which means ‘born again’. What is meant here is the paradigm shift of the West, from revelation and religion to reason and philosophy. Which is why they described the experience as being born again, because they were reminded of their Greek ‘origins’; a belief system based on philosophy. As such,they revised the thoughts of Aristotle and Plato, forming two major philosophic schools of thought that were very much opposed to one another: Rationalism and Empiricism. Rationalism claims that truth can only be reached by virtue of reason, whereas Empiricism argues that truth can only be achieved by virtue of what can be demonstrated and verified by sensory perception. Although their differences were large, these two schools of thought in general shared the same attitude towards religion; that religion should be deleted off the dictionary of Western thought. A few centuries later, the Empiricist became triumphant over the Rationalists, giving birth to what is known today as modern science and the modern age, aided by the Logical Postivists and by Kant.

This is the experience that the West went through. But did we go through the same experience? What is the Muslim view of history? Can we classify our Sirah to the four phases experienced by the West? Did we actually go through all that? Can truth and progress be achieved only through modern science? What is Islam’s view of truth and modern science? Or even more importantly, what is Islam’s view of religion?

Perhaps I am being overtly extreme at posing questions for my dear readers. Forgive me. But these questions, I believe, are of utmost importance in solving the crisis of thought in the ummah. This is the battlefront that we should engage in. Not stale polemics that weaken unity. And not those ensuing debates on details that are of insignificance and triviality, for instance, of maulids, tahlils, keeping a beard etc. that unfortunately has dominated the discourse of our community, especially in the madrasahs.

The West obviously does not have a monopoly of truth and of understanding certain terms like what it means to be progressive, advanced and competitive!

Perhaps we can think of these major questions and issues together, insya-Allah.

Wallahu ‘Alam

"We succeed because of our own efforts, not because of fate." Do we?

2010-12-01T02:37:00.000-08:00

I was reading the newspaper one day while taking a break from exam revision when this sentence caught my eye:

"We succeed because of our own efforts, not because of fate."

Apparently those words came out of a 'rising star' politician in a political rally, may Allah guide him to the true path.

Before we actually embark on investigating how far this claim is true, perhaps it is wise to think of the best of this chap. He probably didn't mean what he said, or that it was made out of ignorance or an outburst of passion if you know what I mean. Perhaps what he wanted to say is that money does not fall from the sky; you have to earn it through blood and sweat. Perhaps perhaps perhaps...

Coming back to the discussion on this particular sentence, I am suddenly reminded by one of those proofs for fatalism which I had to refute in my philosophical logic class:

1. ‘Either you are going to be killed in this raid or you are not.’
2. ‘If you are going to be killed, then you will be killed even if you take precautions.’
3. ‘If you are not going to be killed, then you will not be killed even if you neglect precautions.’
4. ‘Hence, if you are going to be killed in the raid, any precautions you take will be ineffective.’
5. ‘Hence, if you are not going to be killed in the raid, any precautions you take will have been superfluous.’

Such is the flawed argument of fatalism, a worldview which suggests that since everything is determined by fate, then there is no room for free will. A word of caution here; fatalism and determinism is NOT the same. The former suggests that there is no point trying to do anything, kinda like an extremely negative outlook of life. The latter also shares the same premise that everything is predetermined, either by causality (the view of the Logical Positivists) or by some other predetermined state. So unlike fatalism, determinism is more like a positive outlook of life: you CAN make some changes, given the necessary conditions.

This topic on predestination and freewill is a rather complex issue. It is not my intent to explore this further, pardon me for my lack of depth. It seems to be a pressing problem for the secular West to define what fate and freedom means, but not so for the Muslims.

Why?

Because our concept of free will and fate is determined by the Holy Qur'an and the Prophetic Hadith, from which scholars like the Mutakallimun and the Intellectual Sufis seek to refine further through rational demonstration and spiritual experience, not through philosophical speculations as how the secular West had to experience, leading to confusion and conflicts. While we acknowledge the existence of the Jabariyyah (Libertarians), the Qadariyyah (Fatalists) and the Mu'tazilites in our intellectual history, we don't see them as alternative schools of thought from which we can choose to become by virtue of study and research, but rather as deviant groups. You can refer to some of the Kalam books written by luminaries like Ash'ari, Maturidi and Al-Juwayni for more specific arguments and refutations of these deviant groups. As such, this issue on fate and free will is already resolved quite some time ago; Muslims should believe that everything is predetermined by Allah S.W.T. The Sufis relate this phenomenon to the concept of alam mithal (world of Divine Ideas) or alam al-'ayan al-thabitah (world of permanent archetypes), you can explore this further in Sufi manuscripts or to the exposition written by Al-Attas/Gulen. The Mutakallimun argued against causality, stating that causality is but God's habitual behavior in controlling nature, He can suspend laws of nature as and when He likes in opposition to the what the Logical Positivists are arguing; that's why we have miracles. Conclusively, the Muslim concept of determinism is not similar to those expounded by the Logical Positivists. In other words, your success is not determined by your own efforts, but by the will of Allah!

So is there any room for free will. Sure there is. Wait, you don't think so?

If you think that free will and fate are two things that are incompatible with one another, you are only partially correct. Problem is, relying on your own philosophical speculations you'd probably be thinking the same way the Incompatibilists in the West are. Try reading it up on wikipedia and you'd understand where I am coming from.

As a Muslim, you should believe that despite accepting that everything is already determined by God, generally there is no way to know what your fate until it is revealed to you. That's where your own 'will' lies, to choose your next course of action.

How do we choose? With knowledge of course. You cannot say you have a choice between buying two similar packets of cookies if you don't know the difference between the two. Choices cannot be arbitrary; they must be performed consciously. That is why in Islam, we say that free will and choice relates only to good things; that's what ikhtiyar is, coming from the root word khayr which means good. In essence, a Muslim can only choose between two or more good things. If he encounters a choice between good and bad, it means he is lacking in knowledge to differentiate between those two. Even worse, if he chooses the bad then he is doing injustice on his own soul!

Relating back to the sentence uttered by that particular politician, we wonder, why is it that Muslims are still confused over the resolved 'problem' of fate and free will? One possible explanation is that Muslims are starting to think like the secular West, and import their problems to us.

I always get offended by this; don't make your problem my problem!

Another possible explanation is that because of the Modernists and the Pseudo-Salafis, we are alienated from our rich sources of knowledge and wisdom by the Mutakallimun and the Sufis.

In summary, while I empathize with the chap who made that statement, the event demonstrates that there is something wrong with the way Muslims think today. Probably he mixed up Islamic determinism with fatalism, probably.

Don't you think so?